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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the degree of income protection the tax-benefit system provides to 
atypical workers in the event of unemployment. Our approach relies on simulating 
transitions from employment to unemployment for the entire workforce in EU member 
states to compare household financial circumstances before and after the transition. Our 
results show that coverage rates of unemployment insurance are low among atypical 
workers, who are also more exposed to the risk of poverty, both while in work and in 
unemployment. Low work intensity employees are characterized by high net replacement 
rates. However, this is due to the major role played by market incomes of other household 
members. Finally, we show that in countries where self-employed workers are not eligible 
for unemployment insurance benefits, extending the eligibility to this group of workers 
would increase their replacement rates and make them less likely to fall into poverty in 
the event of unemployment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Non-standard forms of employment, in particular temporary jobs, part-time work and solo 
self-employment, have become increasingly widespread in advanced economies in the 
last two decades.3 The proportion of permanent full-time employment in relation to total 
employment declined by 4 percentage points between 2002 and 2016, when it reached 59 
percent (European Commission, 2018a). In the same period, the proportion of permanent 
part-time workers increased by 2 percentage points. Temporary workers, both full-time 
and part-time, and solo self-employed also increased their prevalence by 1 percentage 
point each. The process has accelerated in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 
The European Pillar of Social Rights, signed in November 2017 by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reaffirms the importance that these 
institutions attribute to supporting fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare 
systems. In particular, under Principle 12, the Pillar proclaims that ‘regardless of the type 
and duration of their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable 
conditions, the self-employed, have the right to adequate social protection’. The European 
Commission has recently adopted a proposal for a Council Recommendation aimed at 
encouraging a wider coverage of non-standard employees and the self-employed by social 
security schemes (European Commission, 2018b).  
This study provides a twofold contribution to the ongoing debate. First, we analyse the 
degree of income protection that tax-benefit systems provide to atypical workers in EU 
Member States and the UK in the event of unemployment.4 We follow the European 
 
3 ‘Non-standard’ or ‘atypical’ work commonly refers to employment relationships which depart from the 
standard model of full-time, open-ended employment contract (European Commission 2016a). 
4 The selection of countries reflects EU membership before 01/02/2020. The choice is justified by the UK 
being an EU Member State in the base year of our analysis, i.e.  2017.  
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Commission (2016a) and adopt a definition of atypical workers consisting of employees 
with low work intensity and the self-employed. Second, we assess the effects of a 
counterfactual scenario in which unemployment insurance (UI) coverage is extended to 
self-employed workers in all countries under the same rules as employees. For this 
purpose, we simulate transitions into unemployment for all individuals currently in work 
and compare their disposable income before and after the transition using the tax-benefit 
model EUROMOD. We provide a detailed comparative static evaluation of the degree of 
social protection offered by the tax-benefit system to standard employees and atypical 
workers in the event of unemployment, taking into account all the interactions between 
the different tax-benefit instruments.  
Our analysis confirms the existence of gaps in social protection of atypical workers, with 
potential coverage rates of UI lower among atypical workers, particularly among the self-
employed. Atypical workers are also more exposed to the risk of poverty than standard 
employees, both while in work and in the event of unemployment. Moreover, our 
counterfactual simulations show that extending eligibility to UI benefits to the self-
employed, in countries where they are not eligible, would substantially increase their Net 
Replacement Rate (NRR) and make them less likely to fall into poverty in the event of 
unemployment. Therefore, our analysis sheds light on the effect of enforcing the 
principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights on the equal treatment of different types 
of workers regarding access to social protection, in particular UI. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 
discusses the differences in the design of unemployment benefit schemes in EU countries 
and the UK. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology. Section 5 analyses the 
extent to which atypical workers are protected by tax-benefit policies. Section 6 presents 
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the results of a hypothetical scenario in which compulsory UI coverage is extended to the 
self-employed in all countries. Conclusions follow. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
The existing literature has highlighted two drivers of the increasing prevalence of non-
standard forms of work. First, labour market and welfare reforms in the last decades have 
often sought job creation and unemployment reduction through increased flexibility in 
labour relations, deregulation and reduced workers’ protection. Such reforms have been 
more frequent among EU countries as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis (Hipp et 
al., 2015). Second, advanced automation is eroding labour-intensive industries, especially 
in developed economies (ILO, 2015). The concentration of atypical jobs among specific 
population subgroups has also contributed to the development of various dualisms in the 
society: temporary jobs are concentrated among young people, while permanent jobs are 
more common among older adults; part-time work is more common among women, the 
opposite being true for solo self-employment (Bardasi and Francesconi, 2004; Hipp et al., 
2015). 
Recent studies have shown that non-standard workers face a higher poverty risk than 
standard employees. The gap in the poverty rates has been widening in recent years, with 
non-standard workers also reporting higher levels of subjective job and income insecurity. 
Low hourly earnings and discontinuous employment tend to increase poverty among non-
standard workers, whereas incomes from other household members and social transfers, 
sometimes received in combination with earnings, reduce their in-work poverty risk in 
many countries. As a result, poverty rates among non-standard workers are more 
heterogeneous across-countries than those faced by standard employees (Horemans and 
Marx, 2013, 2017; Horemans, 2017; Burgoon and Dekker, 2010). 
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Existing welfare institutions are undergoing a ‘rethink and reform’ process to cope with 
the changing labour markets (Spasova et al., 2017). As currently designed, social 
protection systems usually meet the needs of standard, full-time employees. Non-standard 
employees are often excluded ‘de facto’ because they are unlikely to meet the eligibility 
conditions, while the self-employed are sometimes completely excluded or able only to 
opt in voluntarily (Spasova et al., 2017; European Commission, 2018c). 
Gaps in coverage differ across countries. Schulze-Bushoff et al. (2008) analyse the rules 
governing the provisions from the different branches of the social protection systems (i.e. 
health insurance, UI and retirement provisions) in six European countries. The authors 
conclude that the degree of heterogeneity is high, with some countries offering more 
comprehensive social protection to atypical workers than others, which could hinder 
mobility and be potentially problematic for the free movement of people and services. 
Nevertheless, the level of coverage offered by social protection systems is probably best 
appreciated analysing the effects of transitions from one labour market status to another, 
e.g. from work to unemployment. Matsaganis et al. (2016) make use of data from the EU 
Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and information on policy rules from the Mutual 
Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) to compute the share of atypical 
workers potentially entitled to different social security provisions. The analysis highlights 
gaps of more than 30 percentage points between the share of permanent full-time 
employees and of temporary employees (both full-time and part-time) entitled to 
unemployment benefits in the event of unemployment. The gap rises to 55 percentage 
points when permanent full-time employees are compared to the self-employed, who are 
often not covered by UI schemes. Our work is in line with the approach suggested in their 
study but exploits the use of microsimulation techniques to assess the income protection 
provided to atypical workers in the event of unemployment. Additionally, we assess the 
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effects of extending eligibility to UI benefits to self-employed workers in all countries 
where they are not compulsorily covered.5  
ACCESS TO UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN EUROPE 
Social protection in the event of unemployment is characterized by two types of schemes: 
contributory UI and non-contributory unemployment assistance benefits. UI represents 
the main instrument for protecting individuals against labour market risks and is part of 
the system of social protection in all EU countries and the UK. Unemployment assistance 
benefits are non-contributory, generally means-tested, schemes targeting specifically 
individuals in unemployment. They are usually less generous and offer complementary 
protection to those who have exhausted their rights to UI or to individuals not covered by 
UI. They are present in a minority of European countries (European Commission 2016b).6 
The design of UI schemes varies widely across countries, as shown in Table A1 in the 
online appendix.7 The eligibility conditions of UI benefits (i.e. contribution requirements, 
type of contracts covered and age limits) are the key aspect determining coverage of 
atypical workers by such schemes.  
 
5 A recent report by the European Commission (2018c) evaluates the impact of extending UI benefits to the 
self-employed in six European countries under stylised simulated unemployment shocks. Their analysis 
focuses on the distributional and budgetary effects of the specific simulated shocks. On the contrary, we 
assess the increased income protection provided by the hypothetical reform among all people in work and 
cover all EU countries and the UK in the analysis.  
6 Additionally, income support schemes, also known as social assistance benefits, exist in all EU countries 
and in the UK. They are intended to provide a minimum standard of living for low income individuals and 
their families, and are not restricted to the event of unemployment. 
7 The information reported here and in Table A1 refers to the general UI schemes. Specific or special 
unemployment schemes for certain categories are not considered. 
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For the self-employed, countries can be classified into four groups in terms of eligibility 
to UI, based on their 2017 policy rules.8 The first refers to countries where the self-
employed are compulsorily covered by UI and comprises Czechia, Greece, Croatia, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. In Greece, however, the 
eligibility criteria for the self-employed are more stringent than those for employees, and 
the scheme suffers from severe non-take-up. In Finland and Sweden, the self-employed 
are covered by the basic component of UI and can opt in to the income-related component 
by joining an UI fund.  
The second category comprises countries where only certain categories of self-employed 
are covered by UI and includes Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal. In Ireland, self-employed 
share-fishermen can pay additional social insurance contributions towards UI. In 
Lithuania, UI covers only the self-employed who own individual enterprises, members of 
small partnerships and full members of partnerships. In Portugal, self-employed managers 
who stop working or close their business on justifiable cause, and those working for a 
sole contracting entity whose contract is terminated against their will, are eligible for UI.  
The third category regroups countries where the self-employed can join UI schemes 
voluntarily and comprises Denmark, Spain, Austria, Romania and Slovakia. Finally, the 
last category refers to countries where the self-employed are ineligible for UI and includes 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands and the UK.  In Belgium, however, a specific scheme (droit passerelle) exists 
 
8 Our classification is based on information from the July 2017 update of MISSOC 
(https://www.missoc.org/missoc-database/ accessed on March 2018), with additional information from 
EUROMOD Country Reports (https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports accessed on 
March 2018).  
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for specific categories of self-employed workers in case of bankruptcy, forced 
discontinuation or economic difficulties. 
Other forms of atypical work (e.g. temporary or part-time workers) are usually eligible to 
UI on the same basis as standard workers, although certain categories might be excluded 
or only partially covered in some Member States. However, even if no legal barriers in 
access to UI exist, temporary and part-time workers might be de facto excluded as they 
are more likely to have short contribution records and would therefore be unable to fulfil 
the eligibility criteria (Matsaganis et al., 2016; Spasova et al., 2017). 
Finally, it is worth noting that in Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, 
Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Finland and the UK, those ineligible for UI or those 
who have exhausted their rights to UI can access means-tested unemployment assistance.  
METHODS AND DATA 
Our study uses EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit microsimulation model, to 
simulate transitions from work into unemployment and compare disposable income 
before and after the transition. This section provides the definition of atypical workers 
used in our analysis, describes EUROMOD and the data, discusses the methodology to 
model transitions into unemployment, and presents the indicators used to evaluate the 
income protection provided by the tax-benefit system.  
Definition of atypical workers 
In our study, atypical work is defined in terms of work intensity at the individual level 
and self-employment. We focus on three population subgroups: (i) employees with 
medium or high work intensity (standard employees); (ii) employees with low work 
intensity; and (iii) the self-employed. We follow the European Commission (2016) and 
define individual work intensity as the proportion of months worked during the year, 
multiplied by the number of hours normally worked during the week by the individual in 
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their main job over the median hours worked during the week (at country level). Work 
intensity is defined as low if the index is below 0.33.9 Self-employed workers are defined 
as those who have self-employment income and no employment income. 
For the UK, an alternative definition of work intensity is used because information about 
the number of months worked during the year is not available in the data used for the 
analysis. In this case, work intensity is defined as the number of hours worked during the 
week (by the individual) over the median hours worked during the week (at country level). 
Work intensity is defined as low if it is below 0.33. 
EUROMOD and the data  
EUROMOD combines country-specific policy rules with representative household 
micro-data to simulate cash benefit entitlements, including UI, and direct personal tax 
and social insurance contribution liabilities (Sutherland and Figari 2013). The underlying 
micro-data used for our simulations come from the 2015 European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Condition (EU-SILC), except for Germany, for which we use the 2014 
EU-SILC, and for the UK, for which we use the 2014/2015 Family Resources Survey 
(FRS). Our simulations are based on 2017 tax-benefit rules. Market incomes and non-
 
9 An employee with weekly working hours equal to the country median will belong to the ‘low work 
intensity’ category if observed working less than one third of the year, i.e. 4 months. Similarly, an employee 
working the full year will belong to the low work intensity category if they work less than one third of the 
median weekly working hours. Under our definition, individuals on parental leave could be classified as 
low intensity workers, depending on their work intensity, if they also report labour income. Due to data 
limitations, we are unable to identify parental benefit recipients and their time spent on parental leave in 
most countries. 
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simulated tax-benefit instruments in the data are adjusted to 2017 levels using source-
specific updating factors.10  
Simulating transitions into unemployment  
The strategy for assessing the income protection provided by the tax-benefit system 
consists of moving people from work (employment or self-employment) into 
unemployment and comparing their disposable income before and after the transition 
(Figari et al., 2011; Fernandez Salgado et al., 2013). The effects of a transition into 
unemployment are simulated for all those currently in work in the data (i.e. individuals 
with positive earnings), aged 18 to 65 years, excluding those in full-time education or 
retirement. Table A2 in the online appendix A presents the characteristics of our samples 
of analysis by country. 
The effects of the transition into unemployment are simulated as follows. First, household 
disposable income is calculated before any transition into unemployment takes place. 
Then, for each worker in the household, individual earnings are set to zero and other 
relevant labour market variables adjusted to reflect the transition, e.g. hours of work set 
to zero. All benefits for which they would become eligible are simulated with 
EUROMOD, as is their corresponding household disposable income in the event of 
unemployment.  
This is done separately for each worker in the household assuming that the earnings of 
other household members are not affected by the individual’s transition. To compare 
 
10 The data underlying EUROMOD are meant to capture income concepts in a comparable and consistent 
way across countries. However, differences in the source and the modalities of the microdata collection 
(e.g. survey vs register, net vs gross), differences in the procedures used to derive gross values when these 
are recorded as net (e.g. Ceriani et al., 2017) or differences in income reporting behaviours across countries 
could affect the cross-country consistency of the underlying data (see Lohmann, 2011). 
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disposable income in and out of work over a similar period, unemployment duration is 
set equal to months in work during the year before the transition.11 Therefore, our results 
should be interpreted as the income protection provided over the first year of 
unemployment. 
The number of months in work before the transition is used to proxy contributory history 
to assess eligibility to UI. In some cases, eligibility to UI benefit is assessed over a period 
longer than a year. For instance, in Germany individuals are required to contribute 12 out 
of 24 months. In this case, our simulations consider a person in Germany eligible for UI 
if they had worked 12 out of 12 months (since month-by-month employment information 
is available only for the previous year). In countries where the qualifying period goes 
beyond 12 months – for instance Lithuania, where individuals are required to contribute 
18 out of 36 months – we use information about working history since entering the labour 
market as an additional control. Unavailability of precise data on contribution histories 
represents the main limitation of our approach to simulate UI entitlements.  
Simulating transitions into unemployment for all individuals currently in work in the data 
is, however, particularly useful for this study because it allows focusing on specific 
population subgroups. Atypical workers might represent a small fraction of the working 
population in some countries, in which case having a sufficiently large sample is crucial 
for the analysis. 
 
11 For individuals reporting both unemployment benefits and earnings over the year, an intermediate stage 
is simulated, where unemployment benefits in the data are set to zero and disposable income is recalculated 
(i.e. assuming inactivity). This intermediate step allows us to consider unemployment benefits only for the 
period in which the person was in work and avoids having results which mix information from two different 
approaches: reported and simulated unemployment benefits. In practice, this step affects only a very limited 
number of observations. 
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Income protection indicators 
This section briefly presents the indicators used to assess the social protection provided 
to atypical workers by tax-benefit systems across EU Member States and the UK. 
Potential coverage rates of UI. UI is the main instrument for protecting individuals 
against labour market risks. We therefore assess the potential coverage of UI, defined as 
the proportion of workers who would be covered by UI schemes in the event of 
unemployment.12 It is expected to range between 0 and 100 percent, with higher values 
indicating a higher proportion of covered workers. The analysis refers to potential 
coverage as it is computed for the entire workforce, as opposed to actual coverage, which 
is based on unemployed people currently in receipt of unemployment benefits. Potential 
coverage rates are expected to be higher than actual (observed) coverage rates, as 
unemployment incidence is not randomly distributed and is more concentrated among 
people less likely to be covered by such schemes.13 The potential coverage of atypical 
workers will be determined by the characteristics of the worker and the eligibility criteria 
of each national UI scheme.  
Net replacement rates. NRRs are an important indicator of the income protection 
provided by the tax-benefit system in the event of unemployment. NRRs measure the 
proportion of household disposable income that would be maintained if a member of the 
 
12 Potential coverage of UI varies with the duration of unemployment spells. Here, we focus on potential 
coverage over the first year of unemployment, when UI would provide the largest degree of protection (but 
to different extents across countries). 
13 Individuals with less continuous working lives are more likely to enter unemployment and more likely 
to be ineligible for UI benefits.  
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household experienced unemployment.14 More formally, the NRR of individual 𝑖 is 
defined as 
𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖 =
𝑌𝑈𝑖
𝑌𝑊𝑖
  ,      (1)  
where 𝑌𝑈𝑖 represents the household disposable income when individual 𝑖 is unemployed 
(𝑈) and 𝑌𝑊𝑖 represents the household disposable income when individual 𝑖 is in work 
(𝑊). For households with multiple earners, NRRs are calculated for each earner 
separately, assuming the behaviour of other earners and household members does not 
change when a person becomes unemployed. 
NRRs can be decomposed as the sum of market incomes (O) (incomes before any tax and 
transfer), benefits and pensions (B) minus taxes and social insurance contributions (T), 
as follows: 
𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖 =
𝑂𝑈𝑖  + 𝐵𝑈𝑖  + 𝑇𝑈𝑖
𝑌𝑊𝑖
  .     (2) 
The household market income when individual 𝑖 is unemployed includes the earnings of 
other household members, as well as other sources of personal income such as 
investments and property income, private inter-household transfers and alimonies. In our 
analysis, we further break down benefits into three components: (i) unemployment 
benefits, including UI and unemployment assistance schemes; (ii) social assistance 
benefits, including minimum income schemes and housing benefits; and (iii) family 
benefits (including child benefits and other means-tested benefits such as the Working 
Tax Credit in the UK), disability benefits and pensions. 
In general, NRRs range between 0 and 100 percent, however, specific features of tax-
benefit systems could result in NRRs exceeding 100 percent. For instance, minimum UI 
 
14 Therefore, NRRs also capture the incentives unemployed individuals would face to re-enter the labour 
market. 
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benefit payments could result in disposable income in unemployment being higher than 
disposable income in work for low earners. To reduce the risk of our calculations being 
biased by ‘outliers’, especially when we consider NRRs for specific subgroups, we 
exclude observations in the top percentile of the NRR distribution if their NRR is above 
150 percent, and observations in the lowest percentile if their NRR is negative.  
Poverty protection statistics. Unemployment is an important determinant of monetary 
poverty. Therefore, we assess the extent to which the tax-benefit system would protect 
individuals from falling into poverty in the event of unemployment. For this purpose, we 
consider the poverty threshold to be 60% of the median equivalised household disposable 
income in the baseline (i.e. before unemployment transitions occur) and evaluate the 
proportion of workers that would fall below the poverty line following their transition 
into unemployment. We do so for each of our subgroups of interest: low work intensity 
employees, ‘standard employees’ and the self-employed. 
Assumptions and caveats 
Some caveats should be stressed before discussing the results of the analysis. First, our 
analysis is static, meaning that behavioural responses are not considered. In particular, 
transitions into unemployment for individuals currently in work in the data assume no 
labour supply responses from other household members. In addition, we assume full 
compliance in the sense that adjustments for tax evasion and benefit non-take-up are not 
considered. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as the ‘intended effect’ of the tax-
benefit system on income protection. Second, data limitation forces our definition of 
atypical employees to be based on work intensity. As a result, all atypical employees are, 
by definition, detached from the labour market and this is not necessarily true. It is 
possible for a temporary full-time worker to be mistakenly classified as standard 
employee if they are in work most of the year, or for a standard employee who started to 
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work after a period of inactivity/unemployment to be classified as an atypical worker. As 
a result, low work intensity is often associated to low annual earnings. Third, the analysis 
focuses on individuals in work, excluding long-term unemployed and individuals without 
employment spells over the year. Because of the detachment from the labour market, the 
degree of social protection offered to these categories of workers might vary substantially, 
with instruments such as social assistance, unemployment assistance and other means-
tested benefits likely to play a more important role than UI benefits. Fourth, 
considerations related to the sample size and of consistency between the income reference 
period and the interview date made us favour analysing the self-employed as a single 
category. Further research could look closer at solo self-employed, whose prevalence 
might be heterogeneous across countries. Finally, due to data constraints, specific 
assumptions have been made to simulate eligibility to UI benefits. Only general ordinary 
UI schemes have been simulated in all countries. Specific or special unemployment 
schemes covering only certain categories are not considered. In our baseline results, UI 
schemes are simulated for the self-employed only in those countries where this category 
of workers is compulsory covered by the general UI scheme. The only exceptions are 
Greece and Denmark. In Greece, the self-employed are compulsorily covered by UI. 
However, the stringent eligibility criteria prevent us from simulating entitlement to UI, 
as eligibility is subject to having no debts to social insurance funds and the income test is 
based on income with one- and two-year lags. In Denmark, we simulate UI for the self-
employed who can join the scheme voluntarily because participation in the UI fund has 
been econometrically imputed in the data. In all other countries where the self-employed 
can join UI schemes voluntarily, we are unable to simulate their eligibility. In Ireland, 
Lithuania and Portugal, UI covers certain categories of self-employed, while a specific 
scheme covers some categories of self-employed in Belgium. However, we are unable to 
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simulate entitlement to these schemes, as we cannot identify the eligible groups in the 
data.15 The consequences of these assumptions in terms of cross-country comparability 
of the results are discussed in the following section.   
ASSESSING THE GAPS IN SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE EVENT OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
This section discusses the main empirical results of our analysis. First, we provide a 
description of atypical work in the EU and the UK. Then, we assess the protection 
provided to atypical workers by the tax-benefit system in these countries, focusing on the 
potential coverage of UI, NRRs and protection against poverty. Throughout this section, 
the tax-benefit simulations reflect the rules in place in June 2017. Confidence intervals 
for the results presented in this section are shown in the Online Appendix B, taking into 
account the sample design of our data (Goedemé 2013a, 2013b). 
Atypical work in Europe 
The prevalence of atypical workers varies greatly among EU Member States and the UK 
(Figure 1). The lowest prevalence is observed in Sweden, with about 6 percent of total 
workers classified as atypical. The highest prevalence is observed in Greece, at about 36 
percent. Figure 1 also shows the composition of atypical employment. In nine countries 
low work intensity employees outnumber the self-employed, while the opposite is true in 
the majority of countries analysed. A strong presence of self-employment drives the high 
prevalence of atypical workers in Greece, Italy and Romania. As self-employed workers 
are not compulsorily covered by UI in most countries, the composition of atypical 
employment is key when assessing the degree of social protection of atypical workers. 
 
15 Information about UI schemes has been gathered from EUROMOD country reports 
(https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports) and from MISSOC 
(https://www.missoc.org).  
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The number of low work intensity employees is particularly low in Romania, where less 
than 1 percent of the total workforce belongs to this category. A subgroup analysis of low 
work intensity workers in Romania should therefore be considered with caution, as 
sample size issues are likely to hinder representativeness with respect to this category. 
Figure 1: Prevalence of atypical work in the EU and the UK (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
Table A3 in Online Appendix A provides information on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of standard employees, low work intensity employees and the self-
employed. In all the countries analysed there is a higher prevalence of women among low 
work intensity employees and of men among the self-employed. Low work intensity 
employees are usually relatively young, whereas self-employed workers tend to belong 
to the largest age group (30 to 50 years old). High-skilled workers are under-represented 
among low work intensity employees when compared to the rest of the labour force. 
Consistent with the skill composition, low work intensity employees are seldom the main 
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household earners, they largely belong to the poorest quintile of the earning distribution, 
and are often part-time employees. Self-employed workers tend to be less skilled than 
standard employees, although the differences are less pronounced than in the case of low 
work intensity employees. The majority of self-employed are the main earners in their 
household, and their earnings profile is more evenly spread than that of low work intensity 
employees. 
Potential coverage of UI schemes 
Figure 2 shows potential coverage rates from existing UI schemes in each EU Member 
State and the UK. The chart shows figures for the entire working population as well as 
for the subgroups of standard employees, low work intensity employees and the self-
employed. 
Figure 2: Potential coverage of UI schemes in the EU and the UK (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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The potential UI coverage for the entire working population varies from 52 percent in 
Malta to 96 percent in Sweden. The median across countries is represented by Cyprus and 
the Netherlands, at around 82 percent. Potential coverage rates among standard 
employees are even higher, ranging from close to 58 percent in Malta to almost 100 
percent in France.16 Differences in the eligibility criteria for accessing UI schemes, as 
well as in the characteristics of the local workforce, explain the cross-country variation. 
On the one hand, contribution conditions in Malta are more stringent than those in France. 
On the other hand, the concept of low work intensity is country specific, as the number 
of hours worked are evaluated in comparison to the country median. It is therefore 
possible that in certain countries individuals with a relatively short contributory history, 
hence less likely to qualify to UI, could be identified as standard workers if they work 
more hours than the median. 
Potential coverage among low work intensity employees is significantly lower than 
among standard employees. The indicator ranges from 5 percent in Czechia, Croatia and 
Hungary to 72 percent in the UK. The median is around 20 percent (Belgium and Spain). 
The extremely small number of low intensity employees in Romania affects the 
representativeness of the results for this category of workers. 
In most countries, the self-employed are not entitled to UI. In eight EU Member States – 
Czechia, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia Finland and Sweden– the self-
 
16 In Malta a Special Unemployment Benefit is also present. This is provided to people who fulfil the 
contribution conditions of UI benefit and the income conditions of unemployment assistance. In that case, 
the Special Unemployment Benefit replaces the UI benefit. The coverage reported consider only coverage 
from the ordinary UI benefit. 
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employed are eligible for UI under similar conditions as employees.17 In those cases, 
relatively high coverage rates are observed as most self-employed satisfy the contribution 
condition for UI eligibility.  
In some countries, our coverage rates would represent a lower bound due to the inability 
to simulate entitlement to UI for some categories of workers. This is the case for countries 
where (i) the self-employed are also compulsorily covered by UI but we are unable to 
simulate the stringent eligibility criteria for this group (Greece); (ii) only certain 
categories of self-employed are entitled to UI but we cannot identify them in the data 
(Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal); (iii) the self-employed can join UI schemes voluntarily 
(Spain, Austria, Romania and Slovakia) but cannot identify those voluntarily registered 
to the UI fund; (iv) specific unemployment protection schemes exist for certain groups of 
self-employed workers (Belgium). 
Despite drawbacks related to the simulation of UI, which might underestimate the degree 
of social protection of the self-employed in the affected countries, the findings support 
the existence of a gap in coverage of atypical workers when compared to ‘standard 
employees’. The gap is due to both a lack of coverage among the self-employed in most 
countries analysed, and low coverage rates among low work intensity employees, whose 
discontinuous working history prevents them, in most cases, from meeting the eligibility 
criteria of their national UI scheme. 
Net replacement rates  
Figure 3 shows mean NRRs in EU Member States and the UK. The figure provides 
information for the entire workforce, as well as separately for low work intensity 
 
17 In our baseline simulations for Finland and Sweden, only the basic component of UI is considered for 
the self-employed, as we cannot identify those affiliated to an UI fund to simulate the income-related 
component. 
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employees, standard employees and the self-employed. The averages are computed out 
of the entire sample of analysis (i.e. all individuals in work) as the indicators consider all 
components of household disposable incomes before and after the unemployment 
transition. Therefore, even if workers are not eligible to UI benefits in the event of 
unemployment, their NRRs might still be positive due to the role of other tax-benefit 
instruments (e.g. an increase in social assistance benefits or a decrease in tax and SIC 
payments) or due to the presence of income sources from other household members (e.g. 
earnings, pensions or other social benefits).  
NRRs for the entire workforce range from 62 percent in Lithuania to 89 percent in 
Luxembourg. The median is observed in Estonia, Croatia and Slovakia, with values in the 
range of 70 percent. NRRs for standard employees follow closely those of the entire 
working population. 
Figure 3: Mean net replacement rates in the EU and the UK (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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Low work intensity employees face higher and more homogeneous NRRs, ranging from 
67 percent in Italy to 95 percent in Greece.18 These seemingly puzzling results are driven 
by the fact that earnings of low work intensity workers have relatively little importance 
for the household finances (see Table A3 in Appendix A). Thus, on average, household 
disposable income is affected to only a limited extent by the entry of these workers into 
unemployment. The finding is consistent with low work intensity employees self-
selecting into households that could sustain them and counterbalance their risk of falling 
into poverty (Horemans, 2017). 
The result is confirmed by Figure A1 in appendix A, which identifies the contributions of 
different tax-benefit components to NRRs. Whereas for the whole in-work sample and 
for standard employees other market incomes in the household range from 40 to 60 
percent of the pre-unemployment household disposable income, these increase to 
between 55 and 80 percent for low work intensity employees. Figure A1 also shows that 
unemployment benefits play a relatively important role in sustaining the incomes of 
standard employees, while this is much less the case for low work intensity employees. 
The result is in line with the relatively low coverage rate of unemployment benefits 
among this subgroup. On the contrary, the figure shows that social assistance and other 
benefits and pensions play a more important role in protecting the incomes of low work 
intensity employees. 
For the self-employed, NRRs show a higher degree of heterogeneity than for the rest of 
the workforce. Values range from 49 percent in Lithuania to 96 percent in Luxembourg. 
The decomposition of mean NRRs is reported in Figure A1. Other market incomes play 
a role similar to that of other standard employees. Unemployment benefits play a 
significant role in all countries where the self-employed are eligible for UI, but also in 
 
18 We disregard Romania because of its very small number of low work intensity employees. 
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some countries where this is not the case (Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Malta). The result 
is due to two factors: first, unemployment assistance schemes targeting individuals who 
are not entitled to UI; and second, and to a lesser extent, individuals receiving 
unemployment benefit already in the baseline and living with self-employed entering 
unemployment. Social assistance and other benefits and pensions contribute substantially 
to self-employed’s NRRs. 
As it was the case for UI coverage, our NRR results might underestimate the degree of 
social protection in countries where data limitations prevent us from simulating UI 
benefits for certain categories of workers. 
At risk of poverty 
Table 1 summarizes the poverty protection indicators for the groups considered under our 
analysis, based on 2017 tax-benefit rules. The results distinguish three separate 
categories: (i) ‘in-work poor’ refers to workers whose equivalised household disposable 
income is already below the poverty threshold before the transition into unemployment 
is simulated; (ii) ‘at risk’ identifies workers who are not poor in work, but who would 
become poor in the event of unemployment; (iii) ‘protected’ refers to workers who would 
not enter poverty even after the transition into unemployment.  
Looking at the entire workforce, the proportion of workers who would be protected from 
poverty in the event of unemployment varies widely across countries, ranging from 57 
percent in Hungary to 86 percent in Belgium. At the other extreme, the proportion of 
workers whose household equivalised disposable is below the poverty line even before 
the transition into unemployment varies from 3 percent in Belgium to 16 percent in 
Romania. France shows the lowest proportion of workers who would fall into poverty 
following unemployment, at 8 percent, while Hungary shows the highest, at 31 percent.  
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Poverty statistics for standard employees follow closely those for the entire population in 
all countries, although the proportion of workers protected is usually higher and the 
proportion of in-work poor is usually lower. The results indicate that standard employees 
would be less affected by poverty in the event of unemployment. 
Low work intensity employees show a higher prevalence of in-work poverty than the 
entire workforce, ranging from 12 percent in Slovakia to 53 percent in Hungary. The 
finding reflects the lower levels of equivalised household disposable income before the 
simulated unemployment transition for this category. As expected, the proportion of 
protected workers is in general lower among low work intensity employees than among 
the rest of the population. The presence of other household incomes, and to a lesser extent 
tax reductions and benefit payments, contribute to the stability of household disposable 
incomes among this category of workers, preventing the proportion of protected workers 
from being even lower. Because of the high prevalence of in-work poverty, the proportion 
of workers at risk of poverty in the event of unemployment varies considerably across 
countries, from 4 percent in the UK to 18 percent in Belgium and Denmark.  
Self-employed workers experience a higher prevalence of in-work poverty than standard 
employees and a lower prevalence of protection in the event of unemployment. The 
proportion of self-employed workers at risk of poverty in the event of unemployment is 
also relatively high, ranging from below 5 percent in Denmark and Luxembourg, where 
UI covers the self-employed, to 39 percent in Lithuania. 
The results presented in this section indicate, therefore, that poverty affects significantly 
more atypical workers, in the form of both in-work poverty and poverty risk in the event 
of unemployment. 
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Table 1: At risk of poverty (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
Notes: The poverty threshold is 60 percent median equivalised household disposable income in the baseline, before unemployment transitions are simulated. 
SE stands for self-employed. 
 
 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12 10 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.5 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
All At risk 10.5 10.7 25.4 15.7 14.1 18 20.1 26.7 25.7 7.9 16.8 18.6 25.5 17.5 29.1 6.7 30.6 31.4 13.4 16.7 25.3 7.6 19.8 20.9 21.6 11.3 10.7 24.2
Protected 86.5 80.1 69.2 80.1 79.8 71.8 76 63.6 59.5 88.3 76.5 69.5 64.5 72 61 85.1 56.9 63.3 80.4 75.8 66.3 83.2 64.2 70.8 73.7 84.9 83.1 72
Poor in work 1.7 6.6 2.7 2.8 4.7 8.6 2.2 5.8 9 2.3 5.3 7.6 8.3 7.7 8.7 7.3 9.1 4 3.7 5.4 5.8 7.5 3.4 5.2 2.7 1.8 5 2.9
Non-Low At risk 7.6 8.8 26.8 16 12.7 18.4 20.3 24.8 27 5.9 16.6 15.8 25.3 17.2 29 6.1 32.7 31.8 10.9 14.9 25.5 6.5 19.9 22.3 21 10.4 10.4 24
Protected 90.6 84.6 70.5 81.2 82.6 73 77.5 69.4 64 91.8 78.2 76.5 66.4 75.1 62.3 86.5 58.3 64.2 85.4 79.7 68.8 85.9 76.7 72.5 76.2 87.8 84.6 73.1
Poor in work 15.2 41 19.8 18 19.7 31.1 16.8 28.6 42.7 15.4 28 30.8 25.1 40.2 38 14.2 52.6 20.6 22.7 26.5 28.6 34.2 17.2 33.4 11.9 18.9 19.7 12.9
Low At risk 18 10.9 6.7 18.1 9.8 11.5 15.8 13.3 14.3 15 5.9 21.1 9.9 15.4 17.4 19.3 9.5 7.2 12.9 10.2 10.3 13 15.8 11.9 12 17.1 19.6 3.7
Protected 66.8 48.1 73.4 63.9 70.5 57.4 67.3 58 43 69.6 66.1 48 65 44.4 44.6 66.5 37.9 72.2 64.4 63.3 61.1 52.8 66.9 54.6 76 64 60.7 83.4
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.2 11.8 13.2 14.1 20 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8
SE At risk 34.5 30.9 22.1 4.6 42 11.3 22.2 32.6 28.7 31 23.8 30.4 37.8 27.1 38.9 3.1 21.3 37.4 36.8 37.5 28.6 17.7 19.5 11.4 26.7 16.6 10.7 29.7
Protected 55 49.7 62.1 80.3 46.7 46 73.3 52.7 43.3 52.7 65.6 43.5 48.7 38.2 45.6 79.7 54.5 50.9 50 48.4 51.4 66 22.2 61 56.2 68 54.8 62.2
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EXTENDING SOCIAL PROTECTION OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED: A 
HYPOTHETICAL REFORM 
The results from the previous sections show that, in general, the self-employed face lower 
NRRs (Figure 3) and higher at risk of poverty rates in the event of unemployment (Table 
1). This might be driven partly by the legal barriers preventing the self-employed from 
accessing to UI, the main instrument that protects individuals from labour market risks. 
In this section, we therefore analyse the effects of a counterfactual policy reform in which 
the self-employed would be eligible for UI under the same conditions as employees. The 
choice of this counterfactual is motivated by two reasons. First, the self-employed are 
already compulsorily covered by UI in some countries. We, therefore, inquire what would 
be the effect of having a similar approach in all countries. Second, the existing design of 
the UI for employees provides a useful benchmark for our simulations, avoiding the need 
to define and justify the values of parameters governing the simulated instrument. We, 
however, acknowledge the challenges of extending UI coverage to the self-employed, for 
whom becoming unemployed could be considered, to some extent, endogenous.19 
Extending eligibility to UI to the self-employed (under the same conditions as for 
employees) would, as expected, substantially improve the coverage rates in those 
countries where the self-employed are not compulsory covered (Figure A2 in the 
appendix). Coverage rates among the self-employed would exceed 85 percent in nearly 
all these countries, with the exception of Malta. The largest proportion of self-employed 
 
19 Alternatively, unemployment support for self-employed workers could take the form of an income 
stabilization fund with the function of smoothing earnings on actuarial basis. Such a scheme could allow 
dealing with some specificities of self-employment, such as earnings self-reporting and potential volatility, 
as well as the endogeneity of the unemployment decision. The simulation of such a scheme is beyond the 
scope of our analysis. 
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covered by an UI scheme would be observed in Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, with 
coverage rates exceeding 97 percent. This is because most self-employed workers in these 
countries work a full year and would therefore fulfil the contribution conditions for 
entitlement.  
In terms of income protection, our hypothetical reform would increase substantially mean 
NRRs for the self-employed population (Figure A3 in Appendix A). Italian self-employed 
workers would benefit the most, with increases in NRR of around 40 percentage points. 
Malta and Ireland represent the other extreme. Despite an important increase in coverage 
rates in the reform scenario, the change in mean NRRs among the self-employed in these 
countries is not significant. This is due to the flat rate unemployment benefit payment 
with 6 months’ maximum duration in Malta, and because the self-employed in Ireland 
would lose entitlement to a generous unemployment assistance benefit when they become 
eligible to UI. Mean NRRs for the entire working population would increase particularly 
in Greece, Italy and Romania, because of the large prevalence of self-employment in these 
countries (Figure 1) and the large increases in coverage rates following the extension of 
eligibility (Figure A2).  
Figure A4 in Appendix A shows a breakdown of the mean NRRs in our baseline and 
reform scenarios across all countries. As expected, the figure shows that in the reform 
scenario the relative importance of unemployment benefits is higher than in the baseline 
scenario in all countries where the self-employed are not covered by UI. Figure A4 also 
allows us to understand how UI benefits interact with the rest of the tax-benefit system. 
Note, for example, that the largest increase in the unemployment benefit component of 
the NRR is observed in Belgium, with a 41 percentage point difference. This increase is, 
however, counterbalanced by a 12 percentage point reduction in the social assistance 
component and by an increase in the taxes and social insurance contributions paid, which 
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generate a further reduction in the NRR of 5 percentage points in the reform scenario 
when compared to the baseline. The result is an increase in the mean NRR of ‘only’ 24 
percentage points in the reform scenario. 
Extending eligibility to UI to the self-employed would also reduce the risk of poverty in 
the event of unemployment (Table A4 in Appendix A). For the entire working population, 
the poverty risk upon entry to unemployment would be reduced by 4.2 percentage points 
in Italy, 3.5 points in Greece and 3 points in Austria. Belgium and Germany would 
experience the largest drop in poverty rates among the self-employed, with reductions of 
just below 30 percentage points. The table shows that at risk of poverty rates among the 
self-employed in the reform scenario would become notably closer to those of the entire 
working population in the baseline scenario. Moreover, the analysis of poverty gaps 
shows that the reform would reduce not only the risk of poverty in the event of 
unemployment but also its severity. 
Finally, Figure A5 in Appendix A presents two indicators of the budgetary cost of the 
reform. Panel A indicates the percentage increase in the average net transfer (benefits 
minus taxes) paid to workers (both employed and self-employed) in the event of 
unemployment, following the reform. Net transfers include not only changes in 
unemployment benefits received, but also in other benefits and taxes paid. The increase 
in the average net transfer would be above 5 percent only in four countries. Italy and 
Greece would experience the largest increases, with a 10 percent and a 9 percent 
increment respectively. Estonia and Ireland show the smallest increase in the net transfer 
per unemployed. Three main factors explain these variations across countries: the design 
of UI schemes, the characteristics of the self-employed population, and its size. For 
instance, the relatively high net transfer in Bulgaria is related to the absence of a ceiling 
on UI benefit payments, and an important number of high-earning self-employed workers 
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who would be entitled to the payment. In Italy and Romania, the high share of self-
employed, as well as their characteristics, contribute to the increase in the average net 
transfer per worker. 
Panel B in Figure A5 reports the net transfer per self-employed worker entering 
unemployment as a share of the net transfer per employee entering unemployment, before 
and after the reform. The indicator allows us to appreciate how costly it is for the 
government to cover a self-employed entering unemployment compared to an employee. 
In the baseline scenario the net cost sustained for the self-employed is usually lower than 
that sustained for employees. As expected, the reform reduces the differences, with 
relevant increases in countries such as Bulgaria and Italy. The results of the reform 
suggest that in most cases covering the self-employed would not be, on average, more 
costly than covering employees. The net cost per self-employed as a share of the net cost 
per employee is on average 1.04 (4 percent higher) across countries where the self-
employed are currently not compulsory covered by UI benefits.20  
CONCLUSIONS 
The changing nature of jobs has raised questions about the adequacy of existing tax-
benefit systems to provide social protection to all types of workers. The findings 
presented in this paper contribute to the debate in two main respects. First, we highlight 
the gaps in social protection of non-standard workers in terms of coverage against 
unemployment risks. These gaps are reflected in a higher exposure to risk of poverty than 
standard workers, both while in work and in the event of unemployment. Second, we 
 
20 Focusing on the low-skilled, who are potentially more likely to become unemployed, the net cost per 
(low-skilled) self-employed as a share of the net cost per (low-skilled) employee would be higher on 
average, amounting to 1.17. In most countries, however, the relative cost would remain below 1 (i.e. less 
costly to insure a self-employed relative to an employee). 
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provide insights into the effect of extending UI eligibility to the self-employed. In line 
with the provisions of the European Pillar of Social Rights, we show that extending UI to 
the self-employed would improve income resilience and reduce the poverty risk for this 
group of workers. Although our work focuses on social protection in the event of 
unemployment, the high prevalence of in-work poverty among low work intensity 
employees also suggests the need to redesign income support schemes, in particular if 
poverty among this group of workers is caused by a mix of involuntary underemployment 
and low hourly wages. 
Both social and economic considerations advocate in favour of closing the gap in access 
to social protection. First, an effective social protection system constitutes a powerful 
automatic stabiliser, contributing to smoothing the effect of the business cycle on incomes 
and demand. Second, from an efficiency perspective, gaps in social protection are likely 
to reduce the attractiveness of more flexible forms of work or of self-employment. 
Additionally, the exclusion from payment of social insurance contribution by some 
category of workers might distort competition between actors who must pay social 
contributions and those who can avoid payments. Related to this, a race to the bottom 
could take place as standard-employment must compete with jobs that do not require the 
payment of contributions. Finally, given the high poverty rates among atypical workers 
and the overrepresentation of young people and women among them, extending social 
protection would improve fairness and social cohesion and enhance the wellbeing of this 
category of workers and their families (Spasova et al., 2017).   
While the need for reducing gaps in social protection emerges clearly from the analysis, 
the means to reach this objective are less evident. Our work provides some insights into 
the possibility of enhancing social protection through an extension of national UI schemes 
to all categories of workers. Alternatively, EU initiatives, such as the Unemployment 
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Benefit Reinsurance Scheme, advocated by a number of academics and policy makers 
(Andor et al., 2014; Von der Leyen, 2019), have been discussed as potential mechanisms 
to harmonise national UI schemes and to strengthen income stabilization within and 
across countries, if carefully designed (see also Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017; Dolls et al., 
2018; Dullien, 2017). A related strand of the literature has advocated in favour of closing 
the gaps in social protection by means of adequate minimum income schemes 
complemented by well-thought employment and economic policies at the national and 
EU level (see Cantillon et al., 2019; Vandenbroucke et al. 2013).  
Further work is needed to tackle the limitations faced in our study. First, imputing 
information on voluntary registration to UI schemes for the self-employed in the data 
could improve the underestimation of social protection in countries where opt-in UI 
schemes exist. Second, labour supply disincentives associated with extending UI 
coverage to the self-employed should be considered, although recent studies tend to attach 
less importance to disincentives related to extending unemployment benefit, especially in 
times of recession (Howell and Azizoglu, 2011). Third, further attention should be paid 
to the effects of income under-reporting by self-employed workers. Finally, further work 
should focus on the effects of extending social protection to atypical workers in other 
spheres of working life, such as access to paternity and maternity benefits and sickness 
insurance. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Characteristics of the general unemployment insurance schemes in the EU and 
the UK, 2017 
Country  
Contribution 
period a 
(months) 
Payment b 
Duration 
(months)  
Unemploym
ent 
assistance 
Income taxes and 
SICs paid on UI 
BE 
12/21 
(age < 36), 
18/33 
(age ≥ 36 & 
age < 50), 
24/42 
(age ≥ 50) 
65% falling to 40% of gross 
earnings, then minimum amount. 
Min. & max. 
36 (no 
limit) 
N/A Tax 
BG 9/24 60% of gross earnings. Min. 4-12 N/A Neither 
CZ 
12/24 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
65% falling to 45% of net 
earnings. Min. & max. 
5, 8 or 11  N/A Neither 
DK 
12/36 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
90% of gross earnings. Max. 24 N/A Tax 
DE 12/24 67-60% of net earnings. Max. 6-24  
Means-
tested UA 
Indirectly (tax 
applied on taxable 
income increases if 
UI received) 
EE 12/36 
50% falling to 40% of gross 
earnings. Min. & max. 
12 Flat UA 
Tax and reduced 
SICs 
IE 9/12 
Fixed amounts based on previous 
earnings. Min. & max. 
9 
Means-
tested UA 
Tax (except child-
dependent element) 
 EL 5/12 
Flat rate with increase for 
dependents. 
5-12 
Flat UA 
(means-
tested) 
Tax (if taxable 
income 
> €10,000/year) 
 ES 
12/72 
(employees), 
12/24 (self-
employed) 
70% falling to 50% of previous 
contributory base. Min. & max. 
4-24 
Means-
tested UA 
Tax and SICs 
 FR 4/28 
40.4% of gross earnings + fixed 
allocation. Min. & max. 
Max. 
24(36) 
Means-
tested UA 
Tax and reduced 
SICs 
 HR 
9/24 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
70% falling to 35% of gross 
earnings minus SICs. Min. & 
max. 
3-15 N/A Neither 
IT 12/24 
75% falling to 60% of gross 
earnings. Min. & Max. 
10-12 N/A Tax 
CY - 
60% of basic insurable 
earnings + increases for 
dependents. Max. 
6 N/A Neither 
LV 12/16 
50-65% of gross earnings; 
reduces with length of 
unemployment. 
9 N/A Neither 
LT 12/30 
Flat rate + 40% falling to 20% of 
gross earnings. Max. 
9 N/A Tax 
LU 
6/12 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
80-85% of gross earnings. Max. 
 
12 N/A Tax and SICs 
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HU 
12/36 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
60% of gross earnings. Min & 
max. 
3 
Flat UA 
(means-
tested) 
Tax and SICs 
MT 5/24 Flat rate. 6 
Means-
tested UA 
Neither 
NL 6/8 
75% falling to 70% of gross 
earnings. Max. 
3-32 N/A Tax and SICs 
AT 
12/24 
(age ≥ 25), 
6/12 
(age < 25) 
55% of net earnings; Min., max. 4.6-36 
Means-
tested UA 
Neither 
PL 
12/18 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
Flat rate; reduced after 3 months. 
Min. & max. 
6-12 N/A Tax and SICs 
PT 12/24 
65% falling to 55% of gross 
earnings. Min & max. 
5-18 
Means-
tested UA 
Neither 
RO 12/24 
Flat rate component + 3% to 10% 
of gross earnings. 
6-12 N/A Tax 
SI 
9/24 
(age ≥ 30), 
6/24 
(age < 30) 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
80% falling to 50% of gross 
earnings. Min & max. 
2-25 N/A Tax and SICs 
SK 24/36 
50% of previous contributory 
base. Max. 
6 N/A Neither 
FI 
6/28 
(employees), 
15/48 (self-
employed) 
Basic component + 45% 
difference between net daily 
wage and basic allowance + 20% 
difference between daily wage 
and daily limit + child 
supplements. 
Min. & max. 
13 
Means-
tested UA 
Tax and health 
insurance 
contribution for 
medical care 
SE 
6/12 
(employees & 
self-
employed) 
80% falling to 65% of gross 
earnings. Min & max. 
12-15 N/A Tax and SICs 
UK 24/24 Flat rate depending on age. 6 
Means-
tested UA 
Tax 
Sources: MISSOC (March 2018), with additional information from EUROMOD Country Reports 
(https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-reports). 
Notes: a Months of contributions/period in which contributions can be made. In Cyprus, eligibility is defined in terms 
of the amount paid in contributions 26 weeks before unemployment. b Min. stands for presence of a floor in 
unemployment insurance (UI) payment. Max. stands for the presence of a ceiling in UI payment. UA – unemployment 
assistance; SIC – social insurance contribution.  
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Table A2: Sample characteristics of the population in work 
  BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample of 
observatio
ns 
545
0 
466
5 
752
8 
651
8 
1112
3 
634
7 
479
4 
1074
0 
1199
8 
1047
8 
549
9 
1617
9 
475
1 
565
7 
444
0 
394
8 
726
2 
445
4 
1110
6 
576
5 
1124
6 
803
2 
671
8 
1077
5 
681
8 
1198
6 
624
7 
1697
6 
Population 
in work 
(000) 
443
9 
306
0 
468
8 
242
6 
3554
9 
617 
174
9 
3532 
1822
4 
2586
2 
147
9 
2265
0 
369 872 
126
0 
231 
414
5 
176 7448 
382
8 
1357
2 
408
2 
809
2 
839 
239
5 
2313 
450
4 
2625
7 
% female 46.5 47.2 44.7 48.3 49.5 49.8 47.3 41.8 45.9 49.1 45.5 42.1 49.2 50.4 48.5 47.0 46.8 39.9 46.7 45.2 46.1 50.2 41.6 44.5 45.7 49.7 48.6 47.7 
% aged 
18-29 
17.4 16.1 16.0 15.1 15.4 20.9 15.8 12.3 12.0 19.5 19.2 12.1 22.6 19.3 19.6 20.3 17.5 26.9 18.6 22.1 18.9 15.5 15.4 13.8 19.4 18.0 18.6 22.5 
% aged 
30-50 
59.0 56.8 59.6 55.4 55.5 51.1 59.1 65.2 64.5 57.9 57.9 60.7 56.6 52.2 51.4 62.0 54.7 51.6 53.8 53.3 57.8 61.3 63.6 65.6 57.9 51.9 52.9 52.3 
% aged 
50+ 
23.6 27.1 24.4 29.5 29.1 28.0 25.1 22.6 23.5 22.6 22.9 27.1 20.8 28.6 29.0 17.7 27.8 21.5 27.6 24.7 23.3 23.2 21.0 20.6 22.7 30.0 28.6 25.2 
% low 
skilled 
12.6 13.3 3.4 15.2 6.5 11.4 15.4 21.2 33.8 12.9 10.0 30.0 15.8 9.2 4.8 29.9 11.8 42.8 18.1 11.8 5.7 50.0 27.7 9.4 2.4 11.1 10.2 45.7 
% medium 
skilled 
38.2 58.0 74.5 44.8 55.4 47.0 29.8 42.2 24.0 47.8 66.4 45.8 42.0 55.8 54.3 39.0 59.7 29.2 41.1 55.2 61.3 26.1 51.4 56.9 72.3 44.7 46.3 25.9 
% high 
skilled 
49.2 28.7 22.1 40.0 38.1 41.6 54.8 36.6 42.2 39.3 23.6 24.2 42.2 35.0 40.9 31.0 28.5 28.0 40.8 33.0 33.0 23.9 20.9 33.7 25.3 44.1 43.5 28.4 
% non-low 
work 
intensity 
87.2 87.1 80.9 89.6 87.3 93.1 78.0 63.6 78.5 88.4 86.5 77.9 82.7 90.8 92.0 90.1 87.4 87.0 82.3 84.6 83.7 89.0 76.8 86.8 85.0 86.9 94.3 85.1 
% low 
work 
intensity 
3.8 4.4 3.0 6.1 7.4 5.5 10.2 4.9 11.4 6.1 4.0 5.3 7.1 5.4 2.9 5.4 5.3 4.0 8.4 6.3 3.8 4.1 0.2 3.9 2.2 8.0 3.6 2.5 
% self-
employed 
9.0 8.4 16.1 4.3 5.4 1.3 11.7 31.5 10.2 5.6 9.4 16.8 10.1 3.8 5.1 4.4 7.2 9.0 9.3 9.1 12.5 6.9 23.0 9.3 12.8 5.1 2.1 12.3 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
Notes: In this table self-employed are defined as those with self-employment income and no employment income. Low-skilled refers to lower secondary education or less; medium-skilled refers to upper secondary, 
non-tertiary education; high-skilled refers to tertiary education.  
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Table A3: Characteristics of atypical workers in the EU and the UK (%)  
    BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Non-low 
Female 
47.1 48.3 46.5 48.3 47.4 49.3 49.9 43.8 45.5 48.9 46.3 43.9 49.9 50.1 48.5 45.8 46.6 40.4 45.2 44.5 47.9 50.1 42.9 45.8 48.2 49.8 48.7 49.1 
Low 70.4 55.0 70.7 57.6 84.2 59.6 59.6 54.9 57.2 64.4 53.7 49.2 54.5 60.2 58.1 68.2 59.6 76.4 68.0 69.0 62.0 61.9 59.2 54.7 64.6 56.1 59.0 79.3 
SE 30.4 31.8 30.9 35.0 36.2 43.2 19.8 35.6 36.6 35.3 34.7 31.6 39.5 43.2 43.8 44.2 39.9 19.3 40.9 35.2 29.0 45.2 36.8 28.8 26.1 38.1 29.4 31.5 
Non-low 
 
Age<30 
17.5 16 16.8 13.9 15.6 20 15.1 14 10.9 18.7 19.2 11.7 21 19.1 19.7 20.5 17.5 27.8 17.9 22.6 19.7 15.2 14.2 13.3 20 16.3 17.4 24 
Low 34.8 33.8 37.7 41.5 18.9 40.1 35.3 28.3 25.3 41.8 51.2 29.5 50.1 30.2 33.5 27.1 30.3 39.8 36.6 36.5 37.6 33.4 44.8 38.6 43.4 45.4 54.2 28.3 
SE 9.3 7.2 8.4 3.3 6.8 5.0 3.3 6.2 5.5 8.6 5.8 8.6 16.2 6.9 10.0 6.1 8.6 12.1 8.1 7.1 7.6 9.6 19.0 7.4 11.7 4.9 6.9 11.4 
Non-low 
 
Age 30-50 
59.6 57.1 59.8 57.3 55.6 51.7 61.2 68.6 65.8 59 58.4 61.3 59.2 52.4 51.8 62.7 55.3 51.8 55.1 53.8 58.9 62.4 66 66.6 57.1 53.7 53.9 52.1 
Low 46.7 44.6 43.8 33.7 51.8 41.7 46.8 58.6 58.1 39.4 41.4 47.6 35.4 44.0 39.8 53.8 46.9 44.5 35.5 46.6 37.5 43.7 47.2 46.1 44.3 34.4 30.3 43.1 
SE 59.1 59.8 61.3 46.8 59.7 50.5 56.5 59.2 61.6 60.5 60.4 62.3 50.9 58.4 51.3 58.1 52.3 53.3 58.9 53.0 56.3 57.1 55.9 64.8 65.3 49.4 47.1 55.1 
Non-low 
 
Age 50+ 
22.9 26.8 23.4 28.8 28.8 28.3 23.7 17.4 23.3 22.3 22.4 27 19.9 28.5 28.5 16.8 27.2 20.4 27 23.6 21.4 22.4 19.8 20.1 22.9 30 28.7 23.9 
Low 18.5 21.6 18.5 24.8 29.3 18.2 17.9 13.1 16.6 18.8 7.4 22.9 14.6 25.7 26.6 19.1 22.8 15.7 27.9 16.9 24.9 22.8 7.9 15.3 12.3 20.2 15.5 28.5 
SE 31.6 32.9 30.3 49.9 33.5 44.5 40.2 34.6 32.9 30.9 33.8 29.1 32.9 34.7 38.7 35.9 39.1 34.5 33.0 39.8 36.1 33.3 25.1 27.8 23.0 45.7 45.9 33.5 
Non-low 
 
Low-skilled 
12.6 11.5 3.5 14.8 6.1 10.9 13.7 13.8 29.7 12.3 9.2 28.5 14.7 8.4 4.7 30.1 10.7 40.2 17 11.7 5 49.5 18.8 9 2.6 9.8 9.9 44.7 
Low 18.6 40.9 9.0 22.0 14.4 19.6 21.2 21.5 53.5 23.1 12.1 42.0 16.0 19.3 8.8 38.8 37.5 46.1 28.0 20.8 14.9 51.9 14.2 9.7 3.8 21.9 11.1 46.4 
SE 9.6 17.8 1.8 14.9 2.6 9.9 21.7 36.1 43.6 10.2 16.4 32.9 24.4 14.9 3.5 15.1 5.9 66.5 19.2 6.6 7.8 55.3 57.7 12.7 1.4 17.6 21.7 52.7 
Non-low  
Medium- 
skilled 
37.7 59.4 73.8 44.1 55.4 46.6 29 43.5 24.5 47 66.3 46.5 42.3 55.1 53.2 38 60.2 29.7 40.8 56.3 60.1 26.4 54.7 55.7 71.4 43.3 45.8 26.2 
Low 45.1 49.4 73.1 47.0 65.9 48.8 42.4 44.0 22.9 54.4 66.2 43.9 45.8 59.4 73.7 45.5 48.8 32.1 48.3 52.1 67.5 26.3 65.7 66.6 73.0 51.7 52.7 36.4 
SE 40.3 48.4 78.3 57.3 42.0 66.7 23.9 39.1 21.9 53.4 67.0 43.0 37.2 65.9 63.2 52.1 61.6 22.8 37.1 47.4 67.4 21.5 40.0 64.0 78.1 58.1 59.8 21.4 
Non-low 
 
High-skilled 
49.7 29.2 22.7 41.2 38.5 42.5 57.2 42.7 45.8 40.6 24.5 24.9 43 36.5 42.1 31.9 29.1 30.1 42.2 32 34.9 24.1 26.5 35.2 26 46.9 44.4 29.1 
Low 36.3 9.7 17.9 31.0 19.7 31.6 36.4 34.5 23.6 22.5 21.7 14.1 38.2 21.4 17.5 15.7 13.7 21.8 23.7 27.1 17.6 21.9 20.1 23.7 23.2 26.3 36.2 17.2 
SE 50.1 33.8 19.9 27.8 55.4 23.4 54.5 24.8 34.6 36.4 16.5 24.1 38.5 19.2 33.3 32.8 32.6 10.7 43.7 46.0 24.8 23.2 2.3 23.4 20.5 24.3 18.5 25.9 
Non-low 
Main 
earner 
65.7 61.3 61.8 66.3 69.6 63.9 63.4 70.4 68.4 66.4 60.9 70.4 64.4 62 61.3 64.8 64.2 58.8 66 64.3 59.2 63.5 64.3 63.5 54 67.8 64.7 62.7 
Low 37.3 35.7 24.2 40.2 28.7 29.4 38.9 41.7 39.2 40.2 22.2 41.6 18.9 37.1 40.2 24.9 36.4 28.5 38.0 28.7 28.3 35.1 20.7 26.1 21.8 43.6 36.9 35.1 
SE 61.9 62.6 59.6 65.1 71.6 49.4 57.4 70.6 66.6 59.2 71.7 62.1 65.6 51.5 65.8 62.9 57.6 66.3 57.9 63.2 66.9 62.2 51.3 43.8 59.4 55.8 57.6 62.5 
Non-low 
Quintile 1 
14.9 8.6 13.8 12.8 11.8 12.8 10.5 12.4 6.4 10 11.2 9.4 9.4 9.3 13.7 14.9 12 13.8 7.8 11 12.7 14.3 1.8 8.1 14.7 8.3 14.4 15.6 
Low 94.0 96.1 98.5 91.9 94.4 88.0 80.9 96.3 71.8 88.8 99.5 74.5 93.2 91.6 87.8 95.1 94.6 93.5 89.8 90.4 97.6 92.8 93.6 95.1 85.8 96.1 88.6 91.2 
SE 33.8 25.5 28.8 46.1 28.3 63.7 20.0 22.5 19.0 36.6 19.6 26.9 13.4 59.3 19.2 33.0 13.9 24.1 34.0 19.9 32.4 37.1 78.3 64.6 32.1 37.7 41.2 35.8 
Non-low 
Quintile 2 
20.1 22.6 20.2 21.5 21.7 21.4 21.3 21.7 17.8 21.5 22.9 17.5 21.6 21.9 21.7 21.4 21.4 21.4 22.2 21 22.4 21.2 22.9 22 21.6 22.2 20.8 20.6 
Low 2.1 2.9 0.4 4.4 4.1 6.5 6.7 2.2 25.2 8.0 0.1 21.2 5.9 3.9 9.8 1.7 1.9 4.4 8.5 6.5 1.1 3.4 6.4 3.7 1.8 3.3 6.2 4.6 
SE 27.9 15.3 24.6 16.5 19.9 12.5 26.2 19.9 27.2 19.4 18.6 28.9 24.7 13.5 15.1 12.5 21.8 20.0 16.9 28.3 9.7 18.4 10.7 15.8 14.4 23.2 29.1 19.0 
Non-low 
Quintile 3 
21.5 23.1 22.1 22.3 22.2 21.7 22.3 23.6 23.2 22.8 22.2 23.1 22.8 22.5 21.8 20.8 22.2 21.1 23.2 22.4 22.1 21.1 25.1 23.1 21.9 23.2 21.5 21 
Low 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 3.1 6.4 0.9 2.3 2.4 0.0 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.2 1.4 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.7 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.0 6.0 0.3 2.4 1.8 
SE 14.9 16.4 14.8 6.1 14.0 13.8 18.5 16.1 27.2 12.8 14.7 17.8 21.6 13.4 15.5 26.6 19.3 22.9 16.8 18.7 14.2 18.3 3.6 8.1 11.2 12.6 8.6 16.8 
Non-low 
Quintile 4 
22.0 23.5 22.3 22 22.7 22.1 23.1 23 25.9 23.1 21.3 25.4 22.4 23.1 22 21.5 22.4 22.1 23.9 22.9 21.6 22 25.7 23.4 21.7 23.2 21.7 21.6 
Low 1.2 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.5 1.6 4.5 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.0 2.0 0.8 1.8 1.7 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.2 4.2 0.1 0.9 1.0 
SE 9.7 15.2 13.8 7.0 10.1 1.1 15.5 18.2 15.7 10.8 28.9 11.5 25.4 5.1 16.3 15.4 18.8 14.6 11.9 15.1 18.0 9.4 3.7 5.3 14.7 11.6 11.7 14.3 
Non-low 
Quintile 5 
21.6 22.3 21.5 21.3 21.6 22 22.8 19.4 26.7 22.6 22.4 24.6 23.7 23.1 20.9 21.4 21.9 21.7 22.9 22.7 21.2 21.4 24.4 23.4 20 23.1 21.6 21.2 
Low 1.4 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.2 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.4 0.0 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.1 1.9 1.3 
SE 13.6 27.5 17.9 24.2 27.6 9.0 19.9 23.3 10.9 20.4 18.2 14.9 15.0 8.7 33.9 12.5 26.1 18.5 20.4 18.0 25.7 16.8 3.7 6.2 27.5 14.9 9.3 14.1 
Non-low 
Part-time 
14.4 2.9 2.8 7.3 13.3 4.7 21.7 12.8 12.7 10.3 3.4 13.1 8.3 6.1 5 13.8 4.6 6 26.2 15 5.3 4.5 0.8 5.1 2.4 6.8 6.4 17.8 
Low 69.2 60.9 54.6 64.6 88.4 67.7 86.8 82.7 72.4 67.6 42.1 86.3 71.6 65.8 74.3 83.0 66.0 71.3 79.6 79.2 60.6 51.7 33.0 57.9 37.5 69.2 54.4 100.0 
SE 6.0 8.1 4.7 22.8 18.4 15.0 20.9 10.6 14.5 10.0 7.3 7.4 38.2 12.1 8.8 15.9 9.4 12.8 27.7 11.6 4.7 9.7 15.9 9.9 4.4 8.7 10.8 21.6 
Non-low  
% hh market 
income 
64.7 57.7 60.2 65.3 68.6 62.7 61.9 69 66.2 65 59.1 68.6 62.7 60.4 60.5 63.5 61.7 57.4 64.6 62.9 58 61.9 58.8 61 52.7 66 63.6 61.7 
Low 45.1 42.7 32.4 46.1 35.7 37.7 46.2 49.9 46.3 49.3 32.0 51.8 29.6 44.1 47.1 35.3 43.5 34.2 45.2 36.6 37.5 42.7 31.5 35.0 28.4 50.4 43.4 42.2 
SE 63.2 56.9 59.3 62.1 68.4 51.6 59.3 68.4 62.5 61.0 61.2 62.2 65.1 54.3 63.3 63.7 56.2 63.1 55.8 60.7 65.0 62.2 51.7 50.0 54.6 56.2 59.9 61.0 
Notes: Non-low stands for non-low-work intensity employees; Low stands for low-work intensity employees; SE stands for self-employed, defined as those with positive self-employment income and no employment income. Low-skilled refers to lower secondary education 
or less; medium-skilled refers to upper secondary, non-tertiary education; high-skilled refers to tertiary education. Quintiles refer to earnings quintiles. 
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Table A4: At risk of poverty: baseline and reform scenarios (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.  
Notes: The poverty threshold is 60 percent median equivalized household disposable income in the baseline, before unemployment transitions are simulated.      
 SE stands for self-employed.
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12.0 10.0 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16.0 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
At risk 10.5 10.7 25.4 15.7 14.1 17.9 20.1 26.7 25.7 7.9 16.8 18.6 25.5 17.5 29.1 6.7 30.4 31.4 13.4 16.7 25.3 7.6 19.8 20.9 21.6 11.3 10.7 24.2
Protected 86.5 80.1 69.2 80.1 79.8 71.8 76.0 63.6 59.5 88.3 76.5 69.5 64.5 72.0 61.0 85.1 57.0 63.3 80.4 75.8 66.3 83.2 64.2 70.8 73.7 84.9 83.1 72.0
Poverty gap 2.9 6.8 7.3 6.0 5.1 7.7 7.1 10.8 12.8 2.3 7.5 13.6 7.6 9.6 14.4 1.1 16.9 12.4 5.4 3.9 12.4 4.4 15.4 7.2 7.0 2.2 3.6 7.6
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12.0 10.0 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16.0 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
At risk 7.9 8.7 25.4 15.7 12.6 17.9 20.2 23.2 24.4 6.7 16.8 14.4 24.6 17.0 28.7 6.7 30.4 31.1 11.1 14.5 25.3 6.6 18.0 20.9 20.0 11.3 10.7 23.2
Protected 89.0 82.1 69.2 80.1 81.3 71.9 75.9 67.0 60.9 89.4 76.5 73.6 65.4 72.5 61.4 85.1 57.0 63.6 82.8 78.0 66.3 84.2 66.0 70.8 75.2 84.9 83.1 73.0
Poverty gap 1.9 5.7 7.3 6.0 4.2 7.7 7.4 7.8 11.7 1.6 7.5 9.6 7.3 9.3 13.8 1.1 16.9 12.2 3.8 3.4 12.4 4.2 13.1 7.2 6.5 2.2 3.6 7.3
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 20.0 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8.0
At risk 34.5 30.9 22.1 4.6 42.0 11.3 22.2 32.6 28.7 31.0 23.8 30.4 37.8 27.1 38.9 3.1 20.0 37.4 36.8 37.5 28.6 17.7 19.5 11.4 26.7 16.6 10.7 29.7
Protected 55.0 49.7 62.1 80.3 46.7 46.0 73.3 52.7 43.3 52.7 65.6 43.5 48.7 38.2 45.6 79.7 55.5 50.9 50.0 48.4 51.4 66.0 22.2 61.0 56.2 68.0 54.8 62.2
Poverty gap 13.1 22.8 9.8 7.9 24.1 17.8 6.3 17.8 22.9 17.9 11.4 34.6 12.7 28.1 28.2 1.0 17.1 17.9 23.1 9.9 19.0 8.9 38.9 9.9 12.7 5.8 12.5 9.4
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 20.0 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8.0
At risk 6.5 6.4 22.1 4.6 13.8 5.3 23.2 21.6 14.3 8.7 23.8 7.0 29.0 15.0 30.9 3.1 20.0 34.5 11.1 12.8 28.6 3.9 11.4 11.4 13.7 16.6 10.7 21.5
Protected 83.0 74.2 62.1 80.3 74.9 51.9 72.3 63.7 57.7 75.0 65.6 66.8 57.5 50.3 53.7 79.7 55.5 53.7 75.7 73.1 51.4 79.9 30.4 61.0 69.2 68.0 54.8 70.5
Poverty gap 2.3 9.2 9.8 7.9 6.5 12.9 8.6 8.4 10.7 6.2 11.4 11.9 9.6 19.9 17.0 1.0 17.1 16.3 6.6 4.5 19.0 6.4 28.6 9.9 8.4 5.8 12.5 6.8
Baseline: 
All
Reform: 
All
Baseline: 
SE
Reform: 
SE
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Figure A1: Decomposition of mean net replacement rates across groups (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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Figure A2: Potential coverage of unemployment insurance schemes: baseline and reform 
scenarios (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
Figure A3: Mean net replacement rates: baseline and reform scenarios (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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Figure A4: Decomposition of mean net replacement rates for the self-employed: baseline and reform scenarios (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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Figure A5: Costing indicators 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX B 
Table B1: Prevalence of atypical work in the EU and the UK (%) – with confidence 
intervals 
 
  
Mean Mean Mean
BE 12.8 11.8 13.8 3.8 3.3 4.4 9.0 8.0 10.0
BG 12.9 11.5 14.2 4.4 3.7 5.2 8.4 7.4 9.5
CZ 19.1 17.8 20.3 3.0 2.5 3.5 16.1 14.9 17.3
DK 10.4 9.4 11.4 6.1 5.3 6.9 4.3 3.7 5.0
DE 12.7 12.0 13.4 7.4 6.9 7.9 5.4 4.9 5.8
EE 6.9 6.1 7.6 5.6 4.9 6.2 1.3 1.0 1.6
IE 22.0 20.5 23.5 10.2 9.2 11.3 11.7 10.6 12.9
EL 36.4 34.8 38.0 4.9 4.3 5.6 31.5 29.8 33.1
ES 21.5 20.4 22.6 11.4 10.4 12.3 10.2 9.4 10.9
FR 11.6 10.6 12.7 6.1 5.3 6.8 5.6 4.9 6.2
HR 13.5 12.2 14.7 4.0 3.3 4.7 9.4 8.3 10.5
IT 22.1 21.1 23.2 5.3 4.7 5.9 16.8 16.0 17.6
CY 17.3 16.0 18.6 7.1 6.3 8.0 10.1 9.1 11.2
LV 9.2 8.2 10.2 5.4 4.8 6.1 3.8 3.1 4.5
LT 8.0 6.8 9.2 2.9 2.3 3.6 5.1 4.1 6.0
LU 9.9 8.6 11.1 5.4 4.6 6.3 4.4 3.5 5.4
HU 12.7 11.2 14.1 5.4 4.5 6.2 7.3 6.1 8.5
MT 13.0 11.8 14.1 4.0 3.4 4.6 9.0 8.0 9.9
NL 17.7 16.5 18.9 8.4 7.5 9.3 9.3 8.4 10.2
AT 15.4 14.3 16.4 6.3 5.6 7.0 9.1 8.2 9.9
PL 16.3 15.2 17.3 3.8 3.3 4.2 12.5 11.6 13.4
PT 11.0 10.1 11.8 4.1 3.5 4.6 6.9 6.1 7.6
RO 23.2 20.6 25.8 0.2 0.1 0.4 23.0 20.3 25.6
SI 13.2 12.4 14.0 3.9 3.5 4.4 9.3 8.6 10.0
SK 15.0 13.8 16.1 2.2 1.7 2.6 12.8 11.7 13.9
FI 13.1 12.4 13.9 8.0 7.3 8.7 5.1 4.7 5.5
SE 5.7 5.1 6.4 3.6 3.1 4.1 2.1 1.7 2.5
UK 14.9 14.2 15.5 2.5 2.3 2.8 12.3 11.7 12.9
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
95% conf. interval
Atypical (all)
95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval
Low intensity Self-employed
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Table B2: Potential coverage of unemployment insurance schemes in the EU and the UK 
(%) – with confidence intervals 
 
  
Mean Mean Mean Mean
BE 81.0 79.7 82.2 92.0 91.0 93.0 19.5 13.8 25.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
BG 78.9 77.3 80.6 90.2 89.0 91.3 8.5 4.3 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ 90.6 89.8 91.4 93.2 92.4 94.0 5.0 2.3 7.6 93.6 91.8 95.4
DK 74.6 73.0 76.2 75.5 73.8 77.1 53.1 46.4 59.9 87.3 80.1 94.4
DE 85.3 84.6 86.1 93.4 92.8 94.0 52.1 48.4 55.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
EE 80.4 79.1 81.6 85.2 84.1 86.3 18.6 13.3 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
IE 69.8 68.1 71.5 84.3 82.8 85.9 39.1 33.7 44.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
EL 65.6 63.9 67.2 99.1 98.8 99.4 51.6 45.6 57.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
ES 72.2 70.9 73.5 88.7 87.7 89.7 22.6 19.5 25.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
FR 92.2 91.3 93.0 99.8 99.6 99.9 66.4 61.4 71.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
HR 86.7 85.6 87.9 89.8 88.7 90.9 5.2 1.8 8.5 93.6 90.5 96.7
IT 74.1 73.0 75.2 93.3 92.6 94.0 27.4 23.2 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY 82.7 81.4 84.0 97.4 96.8 98.0 30.2 24.4 36.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LV 81.3 80.1 82.5 88.8 87.9 89.7 12.9 8.5 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
LT 82.9 81.2 84.7 89.7 88.2 91.3 13.5 4.6 22.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
LU 92.9 91.9 93.9 95.1 94.2 96.1 53.8 45.3 62.4 95.0 90.8 99.2
HU 84.5 83.1 85.9 88.8 87.6 89.9 5.5 2.6 8.5 91.4 87.1 95.6
MT 52.1 50.2 53.9 58.3 56.4 60.3 32.2 24.7 39.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
NL 81.7 80.5 83.0 95.9 95.2 96.6 33.6 28.6 38.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
AT 86.0 84.9 87.0 97.6 97.2 98.1 53.3 47.4 59.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
PL 88.5 87.7 89.3 91.8 91.1 92.6 7.8 4.7 10.9 90.3 88.1 92.5
PT 82.8 81.7 83.9 92.1 91.3 92.9 18.4 13.5 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
RO 74.6 72.0 77.3 97.2 96.6 97.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SI 89.0 88.3 89.7 91.8 91.1 92.5 14.5 10.0 19.0 93.9 92.3 95.6
SK 72.8 71.4 74.3 85.4 84.3 86.6 7.9 3.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
FI 90.6 89.9 91.4 97.6 97.2 97.9 16.6 13.1 20.1 89.3 86.8 91.8
SE 96.5 95.9 97.0 98.8 98.5 99.1 33.5 26.6 40.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
UK 80.9 80.2 81.7 92.9 92.3 93.5 72.2 67.0 77.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
95% conf. interval
Self-employedAll Non-low intensity Low intensity
95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval
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Table B3: Mean Net Replacement Rates in the EU and the UK (%) – with confidence 
intervals 
 
  
Mean Mean Mean Mean
BE 80.0 79.4 80.5 80.7 80.2 81.3 92.6 90.3 94.8 67.1 64.9 69.2
BG 78.3 77.7 78.9 79.6 79.0 80.1 87.9 85.7 90.1 60.1 57.3 62.8
CZ 67.6 67.2 68.1 65.6 65.1 66.1 91.9 90.7 93.1 73.3 72.0 74.7
DK 75.6 74.9 76.4 74.3 73.6 75.1 92.6 89.2 96.0 78.9 73.9 83.9
DE 77.2 76.8 77.5 77.5 77.2 77.8 90.2 89.2 91.1 53.8 51.1 56.5
EE 71.1 70.5 71.7 69.8 69.1 70.4 88.8 87.0 90.6 87.7 82.3 93.2
IE 66.6 65.7 67.4 64.0 63.1 64.9 84.8 82.6 87.0 67.6 65.1 70.1
EL 68.6 67.9 69.3 69.0 68.3 69.8 95.3 93.8 96.7 63.5 62.1 65.0
ES 67.9 67.4 68.5 64.8 64.2 65.5 88.5 87.4 89.6 68.9 66.9 70.9
FR 84.9 84.6 85.2 85.5 85.2 85.8 91.5 90.4 92.6 68.5 65.7 71.3
HR 70.9 70.2 71.6 70.3 69.5 71.0 88.6 86.5 90.6 68.9 66.2 71.6
IT 68.5 67.8 69.1 72.1 71.5 72.7 67.0 63.8 70.1 52.1 50.3 53.9
CY 70.1 69.4 70.7 68.7 68.0 69.4 90.4 89.3 91.6 67.1 64.7 69.6
LV 70.2 69.7 70.8 69.6 69.0 70.1 83.2 81.1 85.2 68.3 65.0 71.7
LT 61.9 60.8 63.0 62.0 60.8 63.2 80.7 75.5 85.9 48.7 43.9 53.4
LU 89.7 89.3 90.1 89.2 88.8 89.6 93.3 92.2 94.4 95.7 93.5 97.9
HU 63.1 62.3 64.0 60.3 59.5 61.1 87.5 83.7 91.3 79.7 75.8 83.6
MT 62.2 61.4 63.0 60.9 60.0 61.7 93.4 91.4 95.5 61.5 59.2 63.8
NL 76.5 75.9 77.0 77.6 77.2 78.1 88.2 86.2 90.3 55.6 52.8 58.3
AT 77.1 76.6 77.6 76.7 76.1 77.2 93.5 92.5 94.6 69.6 67.6 71.5
PL 64.9 64.2 65.6 63.9 63.2 64.6 86.9 85.2 88.6 65.3 63.2 67.5
PT 84.1 83.8 84.5 84.8 84.5 85.2 89.6 87.8 91.3 72.0 69.5 74.5
RO 66.7 65.8 67.6 65.1 64.2 66.0 89.8 85.8 93.8 71.7 69.5 74.0
SI 71.4 70.9 71.8 69.0 68.5 69.4 87.0 85.3 88.6 87.5 85.9 89.1
SK 70.7 70.2 71.2 69.8 69.3 70.4 85.5 83.4 87.5 74.2 72.5 75.9
FI 78.4 78.1 78.7 77.2 76.8 77.5 91.0 90.2 91.8 79.8 78.3 81.3
SE 79.7 79.3 80.1 79.3 79.0 79.7 81.2 77.7 84.8 92.3 88.4 96.2
UK 64.7 64.3 65.0 63.6 63.2 64.0 93.9 92.8 95.0 66.1 65.0 67.1
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
All Non-low intensity Low intensity Self-employed
95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval
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Table B4: At risk of poverty (%) – with confidence intervals 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12.0 10.0 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16.0 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
(2.5;3.7) (7.8;10.6) (4.5;6.2) (3.3;5.3) (5.6;6.7) (9.1;11.4) (3.2;4.7) (8.8;10.7) (13.6;15.9) (3.3;4.5) (5.7;7.7) (10.6;13.3) (8.7;11.4) (9.3;11.6) (8.3;11.5) (6.8;9.5) (11.1;14.1) (4.5;6.2) (5.0;7.3) (6.6;8.5) (7.5;9.3) (8.3;10.1) (13.8;18.2) (7.5;9.2) (4.0;5.6) (3.3;4.4) (5.3;6.9) (3.4;4.1)
At risk 10.5 10.7 25.4 15.7 14.1 17.9 20.1 26.7 25.7 7.9 16.8 18.6 25.5 17.5 29.1 6.7 30.4 31.4 13.4 16.7 25.3 7.6 19.8 20.9 21.6 11.3 10.7 24.2
(9.5;11.4) (9.6;11.8) (24.2;26.7) (14.4;16.9) (13.3;14.8) (16.6;19.3) (18.6;21.6) (25.4;27.9) (24.6;26.8) (7.1;8.6) (15.4;18.3) (17.6;19.5) (23.8;27.1) (16.2;18.8) (26.8;31.5) (5.5;8.0) (28.8;32.0) (29.6;33.1) (12.2;14.7) (15.5;17.8) (24.1;26.5) (6.8;8.3) (18.2;21.5) (19.7;22.0) (20.1;23.0) (10.4;12.1) (9.7;11.7) (23.4;25.0)
Protected 86.5 80.1 69.2 80.1 79.8 71.8 76.0 63.6 59.5 88.3 76.5 69.5 64.5 72.0 61.0 85.1 57.0 63.3 80.4 75.8 66.3 83.2 64.2 70.8 73.7 84.9 83.1 72.0
(85.4;87.6) (78.3;81.9) (67.8;70.7) (78.5;81.6) (78.9;80.7) (70.1;73.5) (74.3;77.6) (62.1;65.1) (58.1;60.9) (87.1;89.4) (74.7;78.3) (67.8;71.1) (62.6;66.4) (70.2;73.8) (58.4;63.6) (83.4;86.8) (55.1;58.9) (61.5;65.2) (78.8;81.9) (74.3;77.2) (64.9;67.8) (82.0;84.4) (61.5;66.8) (69.5;72.1) (72.0;75.3) (83.9;85.9) (81.9;84.3) (71.2;72.9)
Poor in work 1.7 6.6 2.7 2.8 4.7 8.5 2.2 5.8 9.0 2.3 5.3 7.6 8.3 7.7 8.7 7.3 9.1 4.0 3.7 5.4 5.8 7.5 3.4 5.2 2.7 1.8 5.0 2.9
(1.3;2.2) (5.5;7.7) (2.1;3.3) (2.0;3.6) (4.1;5.2) (7.5;9.6) (1.6;2.8) (5.1;6.5) (8.0;10.0) (1.9;2.7) (4.4;6.2) (6.4;8.9) (7.1;9.5) (6.7;8.7) (7.1;10.2) (6.1;8.6) (7.9;10.2) (3.2;4.7) (2.7;4.6) (4.5;6.3) (5.0;6.5) (6.7;8.4) (2.7;4.1) (4.5;5.9) (2.2;3.3) (1.4;2.2) (4.3;5.7) (2.6;3.2)
At risk 7.6 8.8 26.8 16.0 12.7 18.4 20.3 24.8 27.0 5.9 16.6 15.8 25.3 17.2 29.0 6.1 32.6 31.8 10.9 14.9 25.5 6.5 19.9 22.3 21.0 10.4 10.4 24.0
(6.8;8.5) (7.7;9.9) (25.4;28.2) (14.6;17.4) (11.9;13.5) (17.0;19.9) (18.7;22.0) (23.3;26.3) (25.7;28.3) (5.2;6.6) (15.0;18.1) (14.8;16.8) (23.5;27.1) (15.8;18.6) (26.5;31.5) (4.9;7.4) (30.8;34.3) (30.0;33.7) (9.7;12.0) (13.7;16.1) (24.2;26.7) (5.8;7.3) (18.1;21.7) (21.0;23.5) (19.5;22.5) (9.5;11.3) (9.4;11.4) (23.2;24.8)
Protected 90.6 84.6 70.5 81.2 82.6 73.0 77.5 69.4 64.0 91.8 78.2 76.5 66.4 75.1 62.3 86.5 58.4 64.2 85.4 79.7 68.8 85.9 76.7 72.5 76.2 87.8 84.6 73.1
(89.7;91.6) (83.0;86.2) (69.0;72.0) (79.6;82.7) (81.7;83.5) (71.3;74.7) (75.8;79.3) (67.8;71.1) (62.6;65.5) (91.0;92.6) (76.4;80.0) (74.9;78.2) (64.4;68.4) (73.4;76.8) (59.6;65.1) (84.8;88.3) (56.4;60.3) (62.2;66.2) (84.0;86.9) (78.2;81.1) (67.3;70.2) (84.8;87.0) (74.6;78.7) (71.2;73.9) (74.6;77.8) (86.8;88.8) (83.4;85.8) (72.2;74.0)
Poor in work 15.2 41.0 19.8 18.0 19.7 31.1 16.8 28.6 42.7 15.4 28.0 30.8 25.1 40.2 38.0 14.2 53.4 20.6 22.7 26.5 28.6 34.2 17.2 33.4 11.9 18.9 19.7 12.9
(10.0;20.3) (31.8;50.1) (13.1;26.6) (11.4;24.6) (16.6;22.8) (24.9;37.3) (12.4;21.3) (23.0;34.3) (38.3;47.0) (11.5;19.3) (20.2;35.8) (26.1;35.5) (18.8;31.3) (34.0;46.5) (26.7;49.4) (8.8;19.5) (46.2;60.5) (13.7;27.6) (16.3;29.0) (20.9;32.1) (23.1;34.1) (27.9;40.6) (-0.2;34.7) (27.1;39.8) (5.6;18.3) (14.9;22.9) (13.0;26.4) (9.5;16.3)
At risk 18.0 10.9 6.7 18.1 9.8 11.5 15.8 13.3 14.3 15.0 5.9 21.1 9.9 15.4 17.4 19.3 9.3 7.2 12.9 10.2 10.3 13.0 15.8 11.9 12.0 17.1 19.6 3.7
(11.5;24.6) (6.1;15.8) (2.9;10.5) (12.7;23.6) (7.5;12.1) (7.4;15.6) (11.7;19.9) (9.1;17.6) (11.9;16.7) (11.6;18.4) (2.7;9.1) (17.2;25.0) (6.2;13.6) (10.0;20.8) (8.3;26.6) (12.8;25.8) (5.7;13.0) (2.3;12.1) (8.1;17.7) (6.8;13.6) (7.0;13.6) (8.4;17.5) (-3.6;35.3) (8.3;15.6) (5.9;18.2) (13.4;20.8) (13.2;26.1) (2.0;5.4)
Protected 66.8 48.1 73.4 63.9 70.5 57.4 67.3 58.0 43.0 69.6 66.1 48.0 65.0 44.4 44.6 66.5 37.3 72.2 64.4 63.3 61.1 52.8 66.9 54.6 76.0 64.0 60.7 83.4
(59.3;74.3) (39.0;57.3) (66.0;80.9) (56.9;70.9) (67.0;74.0) (50.9;64.0) (61.9;72.8) (51.6;64.5) (39.1;47.0) (64.7;74.5) (57.9;74.3) (42.9;53.2) (58.4;71.5) (38.1;50.7) (33.3;55.8) (58.7;74.3) (30.3;44.3) (64.4;79.9) (57.8;71.0) (57.4;69.2) (55.1;67.1) (46.0;59.6) (43.4;90.5) (48.5;60.8) (67.7;84.4) (59.4;68.6) (53.1;68.3) (79.7;87.1)
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 20.0 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8.0
(7.4;13.8) (13.8;24.9) (12.9;18.9) (7.0;23.2) (8.5;14.2) (30.9;54.6) (2.5;6.4) (12.7;16.7) (24.5;31.7) (11.8;20.7) (7.3;13.9) (23.5;28.8) (9.8;17.3) (27.9;41.6) (10.1;20.9) (10.1;24.2) (18.1;31.1) (8.2;15.4) (9.0;17.4) (10.8;17.4) (17.0;22.9) (12.4;20.1) (53.3;63.2) (23.8;31.3) (13.4;20.8) (12.2;18.7) (25.2;43.7) (6.8;9.3)
At risk 34.5 30.9 22.1 4.6 42.0 11.3 22.2 32.6 28.7 31.0 23.8 30.4 37.8 27.1 38.9 3.1 20.0 37.4 36.8 37.5 28.6 17.7 19.5 11.4 26.7 16.6 10.7 29.7
(29.8;39.1) (25.1;36.7) (19.1;25.0) (1.1;8.2) (37.6;46.4) (4.5;18.0) (17.7;26.8) (30.3;34.9) (25.3;32.0) (25.8;36.2) (18.9;28.8) (27.9;32.9) (32.5;43.1) (20.8;33.4) (30.3;47.5) (-1.0;7.3) (14.7;25.2) (31.9;42.8) (31.9;41.7) (32.9;42.2) (25.5;31.8) (14.0;21.5) (15.7;23.3) (9.1;13.8) (22.5;30.9) (13.8;19.3) (4.3;17.2) (27.5;32.0)
Protected 55.0 49.7 62.1 80.3 46.7 46.0 73.3 52.7 43.3 52.7 65.6 43.5 48.7 38.2 45.6 79.7 55.5 50.9 50.0 48.4 51.4 66.0 22.2 61.0 56.2 68.0 54.8 62.2
(50.0;59.9) (43.6;55.9) (58.3;65.8) (71.9;88.6) (42.2;51.1) (34.3;57.7) (68.5;78.1) (49.9;55.5) (39.7;46.8) (46.7;58.8) (60.0;71.1) (41.0;45.9) (43.3;54.0) (31.3;45.0) (36.1;55.2) (71.8;87.7) (48.9;62.1) (45.1;56.6) (45.1;54.9) (43.5;53.2) (47.7;55.2) (61.2;70.8) (18.8;25.7) (57.3;64.8) (51.4;60.9) (64.3;71.7) (45.4;64.3) (59.8;64.7)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
Notes: The poverty threshold is 60 percent of median equivalized household disposable income in the baseline, before unemployment transitions are simulated. SE stands for self-employed. 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis.
All
Non-Low
Low
SE
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Table B5: Potential coverage of unemployment insurance schemes: baseline and reform 
scenarios (%) – with confidence intervals 
 
 
  
Mean Mean Mean Mean
BE 81.0 79.7 82.2 89.7 88.7 90.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.8 95.2 98.4
BG 78.9 77.3 80.6 86.5 85.2 87.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.7 86.1 93.3
CZ 90.6 89.8 91.4 90.6 89.8 91.4 93.6 91.8 95.4 93.6 91.8 95.4
DK 74.6 73.0 76.2 74.6 73.0 76.2 87.3 80.1 94.4 87.3 80.1 94.4
DE 85.3 84.6 86.1 90.4 89.8 91.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.3 92.2 96.4
EE 80.4 79.1 81.6 81.5 80.3 82.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.2 79.0 95.5
IE 69.8 68.1 71.5 79.9 78.3 81.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.6 81.3 90.0
EL 65.6 63.9 67.2 96.8 96.3 97.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 98.8 99.5
ES 72.2 70.9 73.5 81.6 80.4 82.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.0 91.0 95.1
FR 92.2 91.3 93.0 97.6 97.2 98.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.0 95.1 100.8
HR 86.7 85.6 87.9 86.7 85.6 87.9 93.6 90.5 96.7 93.6 90.5 96.7
IT 74.1 73.0 75.2 91.4 90.6 92.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.1 96.3 97.9
CY 82.7 81.4 84.0 92.1 91.1 93.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.2 89.4 95.0
LV 81.3 80.1 82.5 84.8 83.7 85.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.6 86.3 94.9
LT 82.9 81.2 84.7 87.5 85.9 89.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.3 84.7 94.0
LU 92.9 91.9 93.9 92.9 91.9 93.9 95.0 90.8 99.2 95.0 90.8 99.2
HU 84.5 83.1 85.9 84.5 83.1 85.9 91.4 87.1 95.6 91.4 87.1 95.6
MT 52.1 50.2 53.9 57.1 55.2 58.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.5 50.0 61.1
NL 81.7 80.5 83.0 90.8 89.8 91.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.4 96.0 98.9
AT 86.0 84.9 87.0 94.5 93.9 95.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.3 92.3 96.3
PL 88.5 87.7 89.3 88.5 87.7 89.3 90.3 88.1 92.5 90.3 88.1 92.5
PT 82.8 81.7 83.9 89.1 88.2 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.2 89.2 95.1
RO 74.6 72.0 77.3 96.1 95.4 96.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.5 91.8 95.1
SI 89.0 88.3 89.7 89.0 88.3 89.7 93.9 92.3 95.6 93.9 92.3 95.6
SK 72.8 71.4 74.3 84.4 83.3 85.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.8 88.3 93.3
FI 90.6 89.9 91.4 90.6 89.9 91.4 89.3 86.8 91.8 89.3 86.8 91.8
SE 96.5 95.9 97.0 96.5 95.9 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
UK 80.9 80.2 81.7 92.6 92.0 93.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.4 93.3 95.6
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
All: Baseline All: Reform Self-employed: Baseline Self-employed: Reform
95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval
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Table B6: Mean Net Replacement Rates: baseline and reform scenarios (%) – with 
confidence intervals 
 
 
  
Mean Mean Mean Mean
BE 80.0 79.4 80.5 82.2 81.6 82.7 67.1 64.9 69.2 91.6 89.5 93.8
BG 78.3 77.7 78.9 80.7 80.2 81.2 60.1 57.3 62.8 88.7 87.2 90.2
CZ 67.6 67.2 68.1 67.6 67.2 68.1 73.3 72.0 74.7 73.3 72.0 74.7
DK 75.6 74.9 76.4 75.6 74.9 76.4 78.9 73.9 83.9 78.9 73.9 83.9
DE 77.2 76.8 77.5 78.5 78.2 78.8 53.8 51.1 56.5 78.3 76.9 79.8
EE 71.1 70.5 71.7 71.2 70.6 71.8 87.7 82.3 93.2 97.7 93.2 102.2
IE 66.6 65.7 67.4 66.5 65.7 67.3 67.6 65.1 70.1 67.1 64.7 69.4
EL 68.6 67.9 69.3 74.0 73.2 74.8 63.5 62.1 65.0 80.6 79.1 82.1
ES 67.9 67.4 68.5 70.7 69.8 71.6 68.9 66.9 70.9 96.6 90.0 103.1
FR 84.9 84.6 85.2 86.3 86.0 86.6 68.5 65.7 71.3 93.8 93.1 94.6
HR 70.9 70.2 71.6 70.9 70.2 71.6 68.9 66.2 71.6 68.9 66.2 71.6
IT 68.5 67.8 69.1 74.9 74.3 75.5 52.1 50.3 53.9 88.9 87.8 90.0
CY 70.1 69.4 70.7 70.7 70.1 71.4 67.1 64.7 69.6 73.5 71.4 75.7
LV 70.2 69.7 70.8 70.7 70.2 71.2 68.3 65.0 71.7 79.4 77.2 81.7
LT 61.9 60.8 63.0 62.4 61.3 63.6 48.7 43.9 53.4 59.9 55.6 64.2
LU 89.7 89.3 90.1 89.7 89.3 90.1 95.7 93.5 97.9 95.7 93.5 97.9
HU 63.1 62.3 64.0 63.1 62.3 64.0 79.7 75.8 83.6 79.7 75.8 83.6
MT 62.2 61.4 63.0 62.4 61.6 63.2 61.5 59.2 63.8 63.9 61.6 66.2
NL 76.5 75.9 77.0 78.8 78.4 79.2 55.6 52.8 58.3 80.8 79.4 82.3
AT 77.1 76.6 77.6 78.5 78.0 79.0 69.6 67.6 71.5 84.7 83.2 86.2
PL 64.9 64.2 65.6 64.9 64.2 65.6 65.3 63.2 67.5 65.3 63.2 67.5
PT 84.1 83.8 84.5 85.2 84.8 85.6 72.0 69.5 74.5 87.3 85.5 89.2
RO 66.7 65.8 67.6 71.3 70.1 72.4 71.7 69.5 74.0 91.8 89.2 94.5
SI 71.4 70.9 71.8 71.4 70.9 71.8 87.5 85.9 89.1 87.5 85.9 89.1
SK 70.7 70.2 71.2 71.8 71.3 72.3 74.2 72.5 75.9 83.0 81.6 84.4
FI 78.4 78.1 78.7 78.4 78.1 78.7 79.8 78.3 81.3 79.8 78.3 81.3
SE 79.7 79.3 80.1 79.7 79.3 80.1 92.3 88.4 96.2 92.3 88.4 96.2
UK 64.7 64.3 65.0 65.3 65.0 65.7 66.1 65.0 67.1 71.6 70.6 72.6
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
All: Baseline All: Reform Self-employed: Baseline Self-employed: Reform
95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval 95% conf. interval
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Table B7: At risk of poverty: baseline and reform scenarios (%) – with confidence intervals 
 
 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12.0 10.0 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16.0 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
(2.5;3.7) (7.8;10.6) (4.5;6.2) (3.3;5.3) (5.6;6.7) (9.1;11.4) (3.2;4.7) (8.8;10.7) (13.6;15.9) (3.3;4.5) (5.7;7.7) (10.6;13.3) (8.7;11.4) (9.3;11.6) (8.3;11.5) (6.8;9.5) (11.1;14.1) (4.5;6.2) (5.0;7.3) (6.6;8.5) (7.5;9.3) (8.3;10.1) (13.8;18.2) (7.5;9.2) (4.0;5.6) (3.3;4.4) (5.3;6.9) (3.4;4.1)
At risk 10.5 10.7 25.4 15.7 14.1 17.9 20.1 26.7 25.7 7.9 16.8 18.6 25.5 17.5 29.1 6.7 30.4 31.4 13.4 16.7 25.3 7.6 19.8 20.9 21.6 11.3 10.7 24.2
(9.5;11.4) (9.6;11.8) (24.2;26.7) (14.4;16.9) (13.3;14.8) (16.6;19.3) (18.6;21.6) (25.4;27.9) (24.6;26.8) (7.1;8.6) (15.4;18.3) (17.6;19.5) (23.8;27.1) (16.2;18.8) (26.8;31.5) (5.5;8.0) (28.8;32.0) (29.6;33.1) (12.2;14.7) (15.5;17.8) (24.1;26.5) (6.8;8.3) (18.2;21.5) (19.7;22.0) (20.1;23.0) (10.4;12.1) (9.7;11.7) (23.4;25.0)
Protected 86.5 80.1 69.2 80.1 79.8 71.8 76.0 63.6 59.5 88.3 76.5 69.5 64.5 72.0 61.0 85.1 57.0 63.3 80.4 75.8 66.3 83.2 64.2 70.8 73.7 84.9 83.1 72.0
(85.4;87.6) (78.3;81.9) (67.8;70.7) (78.5;81.6) (78.9;80.7) (70.1;73.5) (74.3;77.6) (62.1;65.1) (58.1;60.9) (87.1;89.4) (74.7;78.3) (67.8;71.1) (62.6;66.4) (70.2;73.8) (58.4;63.6) (83.4;86.8) (55.1;58.9) (61.5;65.2) (78.8;81.9) (74.3;77.2) (64.9;67.8) (82.0;84.4) (61.5;66.8) (69.5;72.1) (72.0;75.3) (83.9;85.9) (81.9;84.3) (71.2;72.9)
Poverty gap 2.9 6.8 7.3 6.0 5.1 7.7 7.1 10.8 12.8 2.3 7.5 13.6 7.6 9.6 14.4 1.1 16.9 12.4 5.4 3.9 12.4 4.4 15.4 7.2 7.0 2.2 3.6 7.6
(2.6;3.2) (6.0;7.6) (6.9;7.7) (5.3;6.7) (4.8;5.4) (7.1;8.4) (6.5;7.7) (10.2;11.3) (12.2;13.4) (2.0;2.6) (6.8;8.1) (12.7;14.6) (7.0;8.1) (8.9;10.3) (13.2;15.5) (0.9;1.2) (15.9;17.8) (11.6;13.1) (4.7;6.0) (3.6;4.1) (11.7;13.1) (4.0;4.7) (14.1;16.8) (6.8;7.7) (6.5;7.5) (2.0;2.4) (3.2;3.9) (7.3;7.9)
Poor in work 3.1 9.2 5.3 4.3 6.1 10.3 3.9 9.7 14.8 3.9 6.7 12.0 10.0 10.5 9.9 8.2 12.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 16.0 8.4 4.8 3.9 6.1 3.8
(2.5;3.7) (7.8;10.6) (4.5;6.2) (3.3;5.3) (5.6;6.7) (9.1;11.4) (3.2;4.7) (8.8;10.7) (13.6;15.9) (3.3;4.5) (5.7;7.7) (10.6;13.3) (8.7;11.4) (9.3;11.6) (8.3;11.5) (6.8;9.5) (11.1;14.1) (4.5;6.2) (5.0;7.3) (6.6;8.5) (7.5;9.3) (8.3;10.1) (13.8;18.2) (7.5;9.2) (4.0;5.6) (3.3;4.4) (5.3;6.9) (3.4;4.1)
At risk 7.9 8.7 25.4 15.7 12.6 17.9 20.2 23.2 24.4 6.7 16.8 14.4 24.6 17.0 28.7 6.7 30.4 31.1 11.1 14.5 25.3 6.6 18.0 20.9 20.0 11.3 10.7 23.2
(7.1;8.8) (7.7;9.7) (24.2;26.7) (14.4;16.9) (11.8;13.3) (16.5;19.3) (18.7;21.7) (22.0;24.4) (23.3;25.5) (6.0;7.5) (15.4;18.3) (13.5;15.3) (23.0;26.2) (15.7;18.4) (26.4;31.1) (5.5;8.0) (28.8;32.0) (29.4;32.8) (9.9;12.2) (13.4;15.6) (24.1;26.5) (5.9;7.3) (16.5;19.4) (19.7;22.0) (18.6;21.3) (10.4;12.1) (9.7;11.7) (22.4;23.9)
Protected 89.0 82.1 69.2 80.1 81.3 71.9 75.9 67.0 60.9 89.4 76.5 73.6 65.4 72.5 61.4 85.1 57.0 63.6 82.8 78.0 66.3 84.2 66.0 70.8 75.2 84.9 83.1 73.0
(88.0;90.0) (80.4;83.8) (67.8;70.7) (78.5;81.6) (80.4;82.2) (70.2;73.5) (74.2;77.5) (65.6;68.5) (59.5;62.2) (88.3;90.4) (74.7;78.3) (72.0;75.3) (63.4;67.3) (70.7;74.3) (58.8;64.0) (83.4;86.8) (55.1;58.9) (61.7;65.4) (81.3;84.3) (76.6;79.4) (64.9;67.8) (83.0;85.3) (63.5;68.5) (69.5;72.1) (73.7;76.8) (83.9;85.9) (81.9;84.3) (72.2;73.9)
Poverty gap 1.9 5.7 7.3 6.0 4.2 7.7 7.4 7.8 11.7 1.6 7.5 9.6 7.3 9.3 13.8 1.1 16.9 12.2 3.8 3.4 12.4 4.2 13.1 7.2 6.5 2.2 3.6 7.3
(1.7;2.2) (5.0;6.4) (6.9;7.7) (5.3;6.7) (3.9;4.5) (7.1;8.3) (6.8;8.0) (7.4;8.2) (11.1;12.2) (1.4;1.8) (6.8;8.1) (8.8;10.5) (6.7;7.8) (8.6;10.0) (12.7;14.9) (0.9;1.2) (15.9;17.8) (11.4;13.0) (3.3;4.4) (3.1;3.6) (11.7;13.1) (3.8;4.5) (12.0;14.2) (6.8;7.7) (6.0;7.0) (2.0;2.4) (3.2;3.9) (7.0;7.6)
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 20.0 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8.0
(7.4;13.8) (13.8;24.9) (12.9;18.9) (7.0;23.2) (8.5;14.2) (30.9;54.6) (2.5;6.4) (12.7;16.7) (24.5;31.7) (11.8;20.7) (7.3;13.9) (23.5;28.8) (9.8;17.3) (27.9;41.6) (10.1;20.9) (10.1;24.2) (18.1;31.1) (8.2;15.4) (9.0;17.4) (10.8;17.4) (17.0;22.9) (12.4;20.1) (53.3;63.2) (23.8;31.3) (13.4;20.8) (12.2;18.7) (25.2;43.7) (6.8;9.3)
At risk 34.5 30.9 22.1 4.6 42.0 11.3 22.2 32.6 28.7 31.0 23.8 30.4 37.8 27.1 38.9 3.1 20.0 37.4 36.8 37.5 28.6 17.7 19.5 11.4 26.7 16.6 10.7 29.7
(29.8;39.1) (25.1;36.7) (19.1;25.0) (1.1;8.2) (37.6;46.4) (4.5;18.0) (17.7;26.8) (30.3;34.9) (25.3;32.0) (25.8;36.2) (18.9;28.8) (27.9;32.9) (32.5;43.1) (20.8;33.4) (30.3;47.5) (-1.0;7.3) (14.7;25.2) (31.9;42.8) (31.9;41.7) (32.9;42.2) (25.5;31.8) (14.0;21.5) (15.7;23.3) (9.1;13.8) (22.5;30.9) (13.8;19.3) (4.3;17.2) (27.5;32.0)
Protected 55.0 49.7 62.1 80.3 46.7 46.0 73.3 52.7 43.3 52.7 65.6 43.5 48.7 38.2 45.6 79.7 55.5 50.9 50.0 48.4 51.4 66.0 22.2 61.0 56.2 68.0 54.8 62.2
(50.0;59.9) (43.6;55.9) (58.3;65.8) (71.9;88.6) (42.2;51.1) (34.3;57.7) (68.5;78.1) (49.9;55.5) (39.7;46.8) (46.7;58.8) (60.0;71.1) (41.0;45.9) (43.3;54.0) (31.3;45.0) (36.1;55.2) (71.8;87.7) (48.9;62.1) (45.1;56.6) (45.1;54.9) (43.5;53.2) (47.7;55.2) (61.2;70.8) (18.8;25.7) (57.3;64.8) (51.4;60.9) (64.3;71.7) (45.4;64.3) (59.8;64.7)
Poverty gap 13.1 22.8 9.8 7.9 24.1 17.8 6.3 17.8 22.9 17.9 11.4 34.6 12.7 28.1 28.2 1.0 17.1 17.9 23.1 9.9 19.0 8.9 38.9 9.9 12.7 5.8 12.5 9.4
(11.2;14.9) (19.0;26.6) (8.6;11.0) (1.7;14.0) (21.1;27.1) (12.5;23.2) (4.7;7.8) (16.6;19.0) (21.1;24.8) (15.0;20.7) (9.3;13.6) (32.4;36.8) (10.7;14.8) (23.9;32.4) (22.2;34.3) (0.4;1.6) (13.2;21.0) (15.4;20.5) (19.8;26.5) (8.8;11.0) (17.1;21.0) (7.2;10.6) (36.2;41.7) (8.4;11.4) (11.0;14.3) (4.8;6.8) (9.1;15.9) (8.6;10.2)
Poor in work 10.6 19.4 15.9 15.1 11.3 42.8 4.5 14.7 28.1 16.3 10.6 26.2 13.6 34.7 15.5 17.2 24.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 20.0 16.2 58.2 27.5 17.1 15.5 34.4 8.0
(7.4;13.8) (13.8;24.9) (12.9;18.9) (7.0;23.2) (8.5;14.2) (30.9;54.6) (2.5;6.4) (12.7;16.7) (24.5;31.7) (11.8;20.7) (7.3;13.9) (23.5;28.8) (9.8;17.3) (27.9;41.6) (10.1;20.9) (10.1;24.2) (18.1;31.1) (8.2;15.4) (9.0;17.4) (10.8;17.4) (17.0;22.9) (12.4;20.1) (53.3;63.2) (23.8;31.3) (13.4;20.8) (12.2;18.7) (25.2;43.7) (6.8;9.3)
At risk 6.5 6.4 22.1 4.6 13.8 5.3 23.2 21.6 14.3 8.7 23.8 7.0 29.0 15.0 30.9 3.1 20.0 34.5 11.1 12.8 28.6 3.9 11.4 11.4 13.7 16.6 10.7 21.5
(4.4;8.5) (3.2;9.7) (19.1;25.0) (1.1;8.2) (10.6;17.0) (0.3;10.4) (18.7;27.7) (19.6;23.5) (11.7;16.8) (4.5;12.9) (18.9;28.8) (5.8;8.2) (24.1;33.8) (9.8;20.1) (22.7;39.0) (-1.0;7.3) (14.7;25.2) (29.2;39.8) (7.3;14.8) (9.8;15.7) (25.5;31.8) (2.1;5.7) (8.9;13.8) (9.1;13.8) (10.6;16.7) (13.8;19.3) (4.3;17.2) (19.4;23.5)
Protected 83.0 74.2 62.1 80.3 74.9 51.9 72.3 63.7 57.7 75.0 65.6 66.8 57.5 50.3 53.7 79.7 55.5 53.7 75.7 73.1 51.4 79.9 30.4 61.0 69.2 68.0 54.8 70.5
(79.4;86.5) (68.3;80.1) (58.3;65.8) (71.9;88.6) (70.9;78.8) (40.1;63.7) (67.6;77.0) (61.1;66.4) (54.0;61.4) (69.3;80.7) (60.0;71.1) (64.1;69.6) (52.2;62.8) (43.0;57.6) (44.5;62.8) (71.8;87.7) (48.9;62.1) (48.1;59.4) (70.7;80.8) (68.9;77.3) (47.7;55.2) (75.8;84.0) (26.4;34.4) (57.3;64.8) (64.8;73.5) (64.3;71.7) (45.4;64.3) (68.2;72.8)
Poverty gap 2.3 9.2 9.8 7.9 6.5 12.9 8.6 8.4 10.7 6.2 11.4 11.9 9.6 19.9 17.0 1.0 17.1 16.3 6.6 4.5 19.0 6.4 28.6 9.9 8.4 5.8 12.5 6.8
(1.7;2.9) (6.4;12.1) (8.6;11.0) (1.7;14.0) (5.2;7.9) (8.2;17.6) (6.8;10.3) (7.7;9.1) (9.5;12.0) (4.4;7.9) (9.3;13.6) (10.5;13.4) (8.0;11.1) (16.1;23.8) (13.1;21.0) (0.4;1.6) (13.2;21.0) (13.9;18.7) (4.6;8.5) (3.7;5.3) (17.1;21.0) (4.8;8.0) (26.2;30.9) (8.4;11.4) (7.0;9.9) (4.8;6.8) (9.1;15.9) (6.2;7.5)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EUROMOD H1.0+ data.
Notes: The poverty threshold is 60 percent of median equivalized household disposable income in the baseline, before unemployment transitions are simulated. SE stands for self-employed. 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis.
Reform: 
SE
Baseline: 
SE
Reform: 
All
Baseline: All
